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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The return of fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy has not been a research priority in macroeconomics during the last quarter 
century.  The primacy of monetary policy and the fiscal stability of the Great Moderation turned 
the focus of researchers in other directions.  However, it is clear that fiscal policy is once again 
drawing the attention of macroeconomists, and for good reason.  The twenty-first century began 
with substantial modifications to the U.S. tax code, commonly referred to as the Bush tax cuts:  
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation ACT of 2001 (EGTRRA) and the Jobs and 
Growth Tax and Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA).  In addition to substantial 
reductions in marginal tax rates, the policy mix included both short-term stimulus such as 
income tax rebates, as well as reductions in capital gains taxes and changes to depreciation and 
retirement exemptions that affect the economy over longer time horizons.  The alphabet soup of 
fiscal policy initiatives continued with the federal response to the financial crisis and subsequent 
recession of 2007-2009, highlighted by the ARRA (American Recover and Reinvestment Act of 
2009).  The case for countercyclical fiscal policy like the ARRA is perhaps strengthened by the 
current interest rate environment, which has witnessed short-term rates continuing to hover near 
the zero lower bound years after the end of the Great Recession.  As of the middle of 2012, 
recovery.gov, a government website created under the Act to track the initiative’s progress, 
indicated that $757.5 billion of an estimated $840 billion had been distributed in the form of 
myriad tax benefits, contracts, grants, loans and entitlements.    
After the U.S. economy’s sluggish emergence from the Great Recession in June of 2009, 
the focus of fiscal policymakers turned to the issue of long-run solvency and debt stabilization.  
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As reported in the Economic Report of the President 2012, the U.S. federal budget deficit was 
$1.3 trillion in 2011.   By the end of 2013 the gross debt to GDP ratio exceeded 100%, a level 
not seen since the aftermath of World War II.  Long-run projections are not any rosier: under 
current law, spending on the major federal health care programs alone will grow from more than 
5 percent of GDP today to almost 10 percent in 2037, and will continue to increase thereafter 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2012 Long-Term Budget Outlook).  Simply put, the current fiscal 
path is unsustainable.    In the near term, the stage is set for continued discussion over the future 
of American fiscal policy as policymakers wrestle with sequesters, fiscal cliffs, debt ceilings, and 
the need to balance potentially conflicting policy goals: reaching maximum employment in the 
short run while formulating responsible tax and spending regimes in the medium to long run.   
Fiscal policy is also prominent from a global perspective, as a protracted period of fiscal 
strain continues to affect the European continent.  Mounting debt and reduced revenues forced 
euro zone countries Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus to seek bailouts.  European Union 
policymakers have faced the same fundamental quandary as their American counterparts, forced 
to choose between limiting spending and attacking tepid growth figures.  In 2013, for the first 
time since 2008, the euro zone brought combined deficits in line with the target level of 3% of 
GDP.  The merits of austerity have been vigorously debated as inflation remains low and output 
growth weak as of this writing.   
The above described chain of events has led to a renewed interest in understanding the 
effects of changes in taxes, spending, and the financing of government debt on economic 
aggregates.  How effective are stimulus programs likely to be?  What are the long-run 
consequences of debt financing when it ultimately leads to increased distortionary taxation?  The 
focus of this investigation will be on making a contribution to the growing body of fiscal policy 
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literature by seeking answers to questions such as these. 
 
1.2 The dynamics of fiscal financing with non-Ricardian household behavior 
 In chapter three I present a theoretical model designed to study fiscal policy in an 
environment that allows for household heterogeneity.  I build from the foundation laid by 
Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), henceforth LPT, by using a neoclassical growth model to 
estimate rich fiscal policy rules, including non-trivial debt dynamics.  The model includes a 
detailed fiscal specification in which income, capital and consumption taxes, government 
spending, and transfer payments all may adjust to stabilize debt.  The original model can be 
viewed as an estimated analog to the calibrated exercise of Uhlig (2010).  One opportunity 
presented by the LPT model is that only fully rational agents are considered.  Therefore, 
exogenous changes to transfers have no effect on agents’ consumption and saving decisions.  
Thus, as LPT point out, the only way in which the model is able to match certain correlations in 
the data is if transfers respond to endogenous variables.  Of most concern is the negative 
correlation between transfers and debt that exists in the data, which can only be reproduced if 
transfers respond to debt.  As a result of this feature, there is an innate preference for transfer 
financing.  I attempt to fill this gap in the literature by considering a similar dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model containing both rational “savers” and non-Ricardian 
“spenders”.  Authors have used various terms to describe consumers that behave in a non-
Ricardian fashion, including rule-of-thumb or hand-to-mouth.  This extension of the literature is 
attractive because it still allows for expectations about policy rules to influence the path of the 
economy while ameliorating the inherent bias toward one particular fiscal instrument.  It has the 
additional virtue of accurately reflecting the microeconomic realities regarding consumption.  
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Specifically, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests the assumption of perfect 
rationality and intertemporal optimizing behavior is unrealistic if applied to all consumers. 
Two labor supply specifications are considered in chapter three.   In the first 
specification, I place a restriction on hours worked so that labor supply is the same for both 
household types.  This is done to mimic the behavior found in many medium-sized DSGE 
models that incorporate rule-of-thumb behavior.  In the second specification, this restriction is 
relaxed by allowing non-Ricardian consumers to satisfy an intratemporal optimality condition.  
The model is fit to postwar U.S. data and estimated using Bayesian techniques.  By incorporating 
the most recent U.S. data, the estimated parameters reflect information from one of the most 
salient periods of fiscal activity in the post war era.  In addition to non-Ricardian behavior, the 
model features rich fiscal policy rules, endogenous debt evolution, distortionary taxation, and 
several real frictions found in medium-sized DSGE models.  
I find that the inclusion of non-Ricardian households directly affects the value of the 
estimated parameters, the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to fiscal shocks, and the fiscal 
multipliers.  Relative to the findings of LPT, capital and labor taxes become more important for 
debt stabilization while transfers play a smaller role.  Capital taxes and transfers are found to be 
more important for output stabilization.  In the restricted model, it is possible to generate a 
positive consumption multiplier in response to a government spending shock when the economy 
is populated by a large fraction of non-Ricardians, even in the absence of nominal rigidities or 
central bank intervention.   
 
1.3 Anticipated Fiscal Policy 
 In recent times there has been much discussion in popular news outlets surrounding the 
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impact of the debt ceiling, fiscal “cliffs”, and  sequesters, policy maneuvers that aim to 
encourage fiscally responsible legislation.  In particular, how would the proposed changes in 
government spending affect the macro economy?  From an academic perspective, which 
theoretical framework best explains these movements in macroeconomic aggregates?  The fact 
these policy measures are made public and thoroughly discussed before they are implemented 
complicates any attempt to answer these questions.  Changes to fiscal policy that emerge from a 
highly publicized debate are likely to be anticipated by agents to some extent.  Legislation and 
implementation lags provide the necessary time for households to adjust their behavior to new 
policies before they take effect.  Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008) and Leeper, Richter, and 
Walker (2011) show that ignoring such anticipation effects can be troublesome for researchers, 
leading to a non-fundamental moving average component in structural vector autoregressions 
that misaligns the agents’ and the econometrician’s information sets. 
  Ramey and Shapiro (1997) tackled the fiscal foresight issue by examining a few salient 
military buildups that were likely to be anticipated.  Their narrative approach relies on the fact 
that military spending is driven by events that are exogenous to the evolution of the domestic 
economy.   This fact is exploited to identify government spending shocks in a vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework.  Ramey (2011) extends this approach by chronicling military 
spending in popular news sources to create an extensive fiscal news time series that dates back to 
1939.  Ramey also uses Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data in a similar manner to 
analyze more recent time periods.  The narrative approach, also represented by Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Cavallo (2005), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) and 
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005) typically finds macro aggregates to behave much differently after 
a government spending shock.  While most empirical estimates reveal a modest expansion of 
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output and consumption in response to a change in government purchases, anticipated 
government spending changes are generally found to decrease consumption and the real wage 
while causing hours and GDP to rise.  The responses to anticipated spending shocks are 
consistent with the negative wealth effect that characterizes the neoclassical framework typified 
by Baxter and King (1993).  One concern that arises with the narrative approach is that the 
particular dates and news sources are chosen by the researcher and therefore are subjective.  The 
use of SPF data may mitigate this concern, but unfortunately the available defense spending 
forecast series is short.   To create a longer time series Ramey combines defense and federal 
spending forecasts and uses forecast errors
1
 rather than the forecasts themselves. 
  The focus of chapter four is studying the effects of anticipated policy changes in both an 
identified VAR and the structural presented in chapter three of this work.  My contribution to the 
literature is manifold.  First, I bring a new data set to bear on the approach of Ramey which 
allows for greater flexibility in the way that forecasts are incorporated in the VAR.  Second, I 
extend Ramey’s approach in two ways: by analyzing VAR’s with stochastic as well as 
deterministic trends and by examining the possibility that the VAR is misspecified using a 
structural DSGE model built to analyze fiscal policy.  In pursuit of the first endeavor, I retrieved 
documents from Federal Reserve archives and compiled defense spending forecasts for the 
period 1965 – 2005.   Since defense spending is forecasted for a much longer time period than 
found in the SPF, there is no need to combine disparate time series and use forecast errors.  I 
incorporate the forecasts as a measure of anticipated military spending to identify government 
spending shocks in a VAR and examine how the results are affected by the manner in which the 
forecasts are utilized.  Two primary results emerge.  When I use the raw forecasts I find that 
GDP, hours, wages, and consumption all rise following a shock to the news variable—in similar 
                                                          
1
 The forecast error is the difference between forecasted and actual defense spending growth. 
7 
 
fashion to the results obtained using standard identification methods
2
.  Output multipliers, when 
measured as the peak response, range from .5 to slightly larger than unity.  When I instead 
incorporate forecast errors in the VAR I find just the opposite: hours increase while wages and 
consumption fall after a government spending shock as is typical with the narrative approach.  
Thus, the way in which the forecast data is incorporated into the VAR becomes crucially 
important to the results. 
 In addition to the empirical results obtained from the VAR analysis, I also use a structural 
DSGE model to seek corroborating evidence.  If anticipated fiscal policy is an important part of 
the data generating process and effective proxies for fiscal news are utilized, then one would 
expect to find a systematic relationship between the structural model forecast errors and the 
fiscal news variable.  In essence, fiscal news should improve the structural model’s ability to 
forecast the data.  To this end I test the fiscal news variable and the DSGE model forecast errors 
for consumption and hours worked for granger causality.  I find little evidence that a systematic 
relationship exists.  The structural model findings seem to indicate that either anticipated fiscal 
policy is not a visible component of household behavior, or the particular measures of fiscal 
news used here are not adequately capturing the anticipation effects.   These are fundamental 
concerns when conducting an empirical investigation into anticipated fiscal policy. 
 
   
  
                                                          
2
 The standard identification scheme orders government spending first in the VAR and uses a Cholesky 
decomposition.  The methodology is discussed in more detail in chapter two. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 The theoretical literature that endeavors to understand the inner workings of fiscal policy, 
while offering many valuable insights, is far from reaching a consensus on the impacts of 
government spending and tax policies.   Whether theoretical or empirical,  fiscal policy model 
outputs are conventionally summarized by reporting fiscal multipliers, i.e. how much output, 
consumption, investment, and other endogenous variables change in response to a fiscal 
adjustment.  Traditional Keynesian analysis generates positive output and consumption 
multipliers that can be quite large depending on the marginal propensity to consume.  Large 
output multipliers were also predicted by Christina Romer, Chair of the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisers, and Jared Bernstein, Chief Economist of the Office of the Vice-President in 
a 2009 paper analyzing the impact of the proposed fiscal stimulus legislation.  Reporting the 
average of two quantitative macroeconomic models, they found that an increase in government 
purchases of 1 percent of GDP would create an increase in real GDP of 1.6 percent, boosting 
consumption and employment far out into the future.  Large multipliers are also reported by 
Eggertson (2009), Leeper and Davig (2011) and others that model unique circumstances like the 
zero interest rate environment during the Great Recession or extreme central bank 
accommodation. After a broad survey of both theoretical and empirical evidence, Robert Hall 
(2009) concludes that the output multiplier for government purchases is probably around unity.  
In contrast, consumption multipliers are negative in the benchmark real business cycle model 
(Baxter and King (1993), for example) since forward-looking, optimizing consumers obey an 
intertemporal budget constraint.  An increase in government spending reduces the present value 
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of after-tax income, inducing a negative wealth effect that crowds out consumption.  This feature 
is at odds with the bulk of empirical evidence, and persists in more complex models as long as 
households are fully rational.   
 Much of the theoretical literature utilizes a variant of the new-Keynesian style dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.  At their core, new-Keynesian models are 
neoclassical growth models (intertemporally optimizing households and firms) augmented with 
various frictions like sticky wages and prices, imperfectly competitive production markets, 
investment adjustment costs, and  habit formation in consumption.  The degree of nominal and 
real rigidity and the specification of the supply side of the economy, including labor markets, 
vary from author to author.  Monetary policy is generally described by a Taylor-type rule while 
fiscal policy, if present, is based on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  Taxes are 
often lump-sum, but many recent models allow for distortionary taxation.  One of the most cited, 
empirically estimated examples of this class of models is Smets and Wouters (2007) which is 
largely based on the similar general equilibrium framework of Christiano et al. (2005). 
 A pertinent example of such a model used to study fiscal policy is the work of Galí, 
López-Salido, and Vallés  (2007).  The authors first motivate the theoretical analysis by 
estimating a standard VAR that suggests consumption increases in response to a government 
spending shock.   They then calibrate a small-scale new-Keynesian model to see if the empirical 
findings can be replicated under plausible assumptions.  Key features of the model include the 
presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, sticky prices, and imperfectly competitive labor markets.  
These components interact in such a way as to reverse the sign of the consumption multiplier 
found in the traditional neoclassical and real business cycle literature, qualitatively matching 
their empirical VAR results.  They report that an important lesson from their investigation is that 
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it may be necessary to depart form the strict Ricardian behavior assumed in many macro models 
in order to capture important aspects of the economy’s workings.  The model I present in chapter 
three improves upon this work in two primary ways.  First, I use time series data to estimate the 
historical ramifications of fiscal adjustment rather than calibrate model parameters.  Second, the 
specification of fiscal rules is more robust, allowing for the simultaneous adjustment of five 
instruments and complex interactions between the instruments.  
 Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2010) extend the more complex DSGE model of 
Smets and Wouters (2007) to include rule-of-thumb behavior and examine fiscal multipliers.  
They find that spending multipliers from permanent changes in federal purchases are much less 
in new-Keynesian models than in “old-Keynesian” models.  The output multiplier upon impact 
was slightly less than unity and steadily decreased thereafter.  After four quarters the output 
multiplier was roughly .4.  The authors then simulated an actual path for government spending 
based on the ARRA and found that multipliers were even smaller than those found using a 
standard shock.  Cogan et al. (2010) also highlight the need for robustness checks in fiscal policy 
analysis, and perform several exercises to that end.  When non-Ricardian households were added 
to the model, multipliers were slightly larger but did not change the quantitative findings 
significantly.  Likewise, when the effects of fiscal policy at the zero lower bound were explored 
by assuming a constant interest rate for 2 years, the multipliers only increased slightly.  
Importantly, they find that the anticipation of the time series of government spending and the 
monetary policy response are important and merit further study.  This is part of the impetus for 
examining the issue of anticipation effects, which is addressed in chapter four of this work.  
 The models of Gali et al. (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) omit 
distortionary taxation, a feature that Uhlig (2010) and Uhlig and Thorsten (2011) demonstrate to 
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be crucial in theoretical analysis of fiscal policy.  Uhlig and Thorsten extend the Smets and 
Wouters framework to incorporate distortionary labor, capital and consumption taxes, and rule-
of-thumb consumers in a calibrated environment.  They show that when distortionary labor taxes 
are used to retire debt in place of lump-sum taxes, which is much more realistic from a political 
economy standpoint, impact multipliers are much more modest while long-run multipliers are 
very small or even negative.  In the same vein, Leeper and Yang (2008) show that omitting the 
effects of debt financing can be severely misleading in real business cycle-style models, and 
agent’s beliefs about which fiscal instruments finance debt play a crucial role in determining the 
path of endogenous variables.  One of the main contributions to the literature in this work comes 
from combining these various threads of the literature.  The model presented in chapter three 
includes distortionary taxation, rich fiscal policy rules, and reflects the historical circumstances 
of the U.S. economy.  I also allow for different labor supply specifications for non-Ricardian 
households, a feature not found in the investigation of Cogan et al. (2010). 
 The theoretical environment for this investigation is based in large part on Leeper, Plante, 
and Traum, (2010).  LPT use a neoclassical growth model and Bayesian econometric techniques 
to estimate rich fiscal policy rules. LPT estimate four versions of the model: one in which all 
fiscal instruments adjust to stabilize debt, one in which only capital and labor taxes adjust, one in 
which only government spending adjusts, and one in which only lump-sum transfers adjust.  By 
calculating posterior odds ratios, they find that historical U.S. data favor a detailed fiscal 
specification, including non-trivial debt dynamics, in which income, capital, and consumption 
taxes, government spending, and transfer payments all adjust to stabilize debt.  They find that 
impulse responses to fiscal shocks vary in important ways when distortionary taxation is 
accounted for.  In the short run the response of capital taxes and transfers is strong while the 
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response of labor taxes is weaker.  Also, debt-financed fiscal adjustments have markedly 
different effects in the short run versus the long run.   
 After estimating the structural parameters, LPT conduct several fiscal policy experiments.   
They assume that fiscal policy parameters are different than the estimated values and compare 
the results.  In particular, they analyze how the speed of adjustment affects multipliers, the effect 
of utilizing a single fiscal instrument to retire debt, and the effect of using enhanced automatic 
stabilizers.  Generally speaking, multipliers are smaller when fiscal adjustments are accelerated. 
When capital taxes are primarily used to finance debt, long run multipliers turn negative while, 
surprisingly, labor tax financing presents no such tradeoff.   
 The LPT model only considers households that optimize intertemporally.  This is 
important in a model that focuses on fiscal policy because of the implications for transfer 
payments, a key fiscal instrument.   With perfect capital markets and the assumption of rational 
expectations, exogenous changes to transfers have no effect on agents’ consumption and saving 
decisions.  An increase in transfer payments today creates an expectation that taxes will increase 
to finance the transfer, whether it happens in the current period or at some unspecified time in the 
future.  In other words, an increase in current transfers does not affect an agent’s intertemporal 
budget constraint and will therefore not alter the optimal consumption bundle.  Thus, as LPT 
point out, the only way in which the model is able to match the real-world correlation between 
transfer payments and debt is if transfers respond directly to debt.  As a result of this feature, 
there is an inherent preference for transfer financing.  I attempt to fill this gap in the literature by 
considering a similar dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model containing non-
Ricardian agents alongside the traditional intertemporal optimizers.  The non-Ricardian 
households do not have the same intertemporal budget constraint traditionally afforded rational 
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agents; consequently, they will react to transfer payments in a decidedly more Keynesian 
fashion.  Specifically, an increase in transfers is seen as an increase in current income, leading to 
more consumption.  The fact that an exogenous change in transfer payments alters the path of 
endogenous variables has led to transfers being referred to as non-neutral in this context, even 
when modeled as lump-sum payments.  Extending the current literature to include household 
heterogeneity and rich fiscal policy rules has several benefits.  First, the extension still allows for 
expectations about policy rules to influence the path of the economy via the fraction of 
consumers that are rational.   Second, allowing for a more flexible role for transfer payments 
removes the inherent bias toward one particular fiscal instrument.  Finally, the model accurately 
reflects the microeconomic realities regarding consumption that are well documented in the 
empirical literature discussed below.    
 
2.2 Empirical Literature 
 Why include non-Ricardian households in an analysis of fiscal policy?  There is 
mounting empirical evidence (see the discussion of Shea  (1995), Parker  (1999), and Souleles  
(1999) below) that calls into question the assumption of universal consumption smoothing 
implied by both Friedman’s permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) and Modigliani’s life-cycle 
hypothesis (LCH).  As pointed out by N. Gregory Mankiw (2000), the canonical models used to 
study fiscal policy incorporate households that smooth consumption over time, and thus fail to 
explain key facts observed in the data.  For instance, the Barro-Ramsey model of infinitely lived 
households  (Barro, 1974) and the Diamond-Samuelson overlapping generations model  
(Diamond, 1965) both assume consumers use financial markets to smooth purchases over their 
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life-cycle; however, empirical evidence suggests that this brand of highly rational and forward-
looking behavior is not universal.  It follows that either consumers choose not to plan ahead or 
are unable to do so because of some constraint or market failure.  One possible explanation for 
the former is that an agent may not be rational in the sense that they are myopic and fail to fully 
consider the long-run effects of not saving today.  Plausible scenarios for the latter are numerous. 
A consumer with a poor credit history, unattractive collateral, or imperfect information may wish 
to borrow against future income in order to consume more today, but remain unable to acquire 
the financing necessary to do so.  Capital markets will not be complete if some households lack 
access to credit markets, preventing even rational agents from making the required trades to 
satisfy intertemporal optimality conditions.  The recent financial crisis in which the value of 
housing collateral sunk and credit tightened serves as a real world example of how individuals 
might find themselves facing financing constraints.  Additionally, many individuals have zero 
net wealth while a small fraction of the population accumulates vast amounts of wealth, much 
more than needed to smooth consumption.  Thus, it appears that the bequest motive leads some 
households to hold abundant savings while other families choose to spend all of their current 
income and leave nothing behind.  According to Mankiw (2000), these facts can all be reconciled 
by developing models that include both types of individuals: the “savers” and the “spenders”.   
With these realities in mind, the model of fiscal policy presented in chapter three incorporates 
both Ricardian savers and non-Ricardian spenders. 
I will now briefly review three investigations into the nature of consumption at the 
microeconomic level which provide the impetus for including departures from strict rationality.  
Shea (1995) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to study consumption at the 
household level.  Shea is able to isolate households in the PSID that can be linked to long-term 
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union wage contracts.  Published information detailing the compensation packages outlined 
therein is used to construct household-specific paths for expected future wage growth.  
Importantly, the changes in wages are predictable from the household’s perspective.  If 
neoclassical assumptions hold, predictable movements in lifetime income should not cause a 
change in the path of consumption as the agent would already be incorporating the information 
into their intertemporal budget constraint.  However, Shea found that predictable wage 
movements are significantly correlated with consumption changes, contrary to the predictions of 
the PIH-LCH framework.  Furthermore, agents respond more strongly to decreases in income 
than to increases in income, supportive of the type of loss aversion behavior predicted by 
prospect theory.   
 Parker (1999) also tests predictions made by the PIH-LCH models of consumption.  
Using household-level consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), Parker 
tests whether expenditures on nondurable goods are positively correlated with predictable 
changes in Social Security tax withholdings.  Two sources of variation in the amount of taxes 
owed allow the response of consumption to predictable changes in income to be analyzed.  First, 
a series of announced tax rate increases occurred in the 1980’s.  Because households differ in 
their share of the tax burden (some individuals are not subject to tax withholding), the proposed 
legislation would cause different percentage changes in income for different households.   
Second, since income that is taxable for Social Security purposes is capped at a predetermined 
level, disposable income rises in a predictable fashion once the cap is reached.  In January of the 
following year disposable income falls again in a predictable fashion.  Parker finds that 
consumption does in fact respond to these expected changes in income, contrary to the 
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hypothesis of consumption smoothing.  Specifically, durable goods consumption increases by 
about a half of a percent in response to a predictable one percent increase in after-tax income.   
 The investigation of Souleles (1999) provides similar evidence by examining household 
behavior in response to tax refunds.  Since tax refunds are a function of events that took place in 
the prior calendar year, the amount of the refund is predictable in the year of its receipt.  
Conseqently, this forecastable increase in disposable income should not cause consumption to 
rise when it is received according to the benchmark PIH-LCH model.  However, data studied by 
Souleles indicates a positive comovement between income tax refunds and consumption.   
  The bulk of empirical researchers focusing directly on fiscal policy have 
employed structural vector autoregressions (VAR’s) to understand the effects of spending and 
tax shocks.   Much like the body of theoretical literature, the empirical VAR approach provides 
only limited consensus as to the impact of tax and spending changes and debt financing.  
However, while the empirical literature fails to speak with a single voice, many estimates do 
reveal a modest expansion of output and consumption in response to a change in government 
purchases.  Generally speaking, this finding is taken as evidence in favor of sticky price models 
of the economy in the vein of new-Keynesian DSGE models since neoclassical theory predicts a 
decrease in consumption in response to a government spending shock. 
 Contributors to the VAR literature, exemplified by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Gali, 
Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), Perotti (2008), Mountford and Uhlig (2008) and Ramey 
(2011b), have used a variety of identification strategies to estimate fiscal multipliers.  Of these, 
the investigations of Blanchard and Perotti (2002, 2008) stand out for the precedent they have set 
in the VAR literature dedicated to the study of fiscal policy.  Fiscal shocks are identified by 
17 
 
examining institutional information on tax, spending, and transfer programs.  The data are used 
to estimate the contemporaneous (automatic) response of fiscal variables to changes in economic 
activity.  Once the automatic response is accounted for, shocks to fiscal variables can be 
identified.  Output and taxes are found to have no contemporaneous effect on government 
spending; consequently, the identification procedure utilized by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) is 
identical to a Choleski decomposition with government spending ordered first.  Across all model 
specifications, government spending shocks have the same qualitative effect, causing 
consumption to increase.  Government spending multipliers that peak in the range of .9-1.29 
were reported.  A section of this paper is dedicated to understanding the effect of anticipated 
fiscal policy, though its effect on consumption was not studied.  Berndt, Lustig, and Yeltekin 
(2011), Fatas and Mihov (2001), Gali, Lopez Salido, and Valles (2007), Mountford and Uhlig 
(2002), and Perotti (2008) have used this basic approach to identifying fiscal shocks, generally 
finding that GDP, hours, wages, and consumption rise following a change in government 
spending
3
.  Estimates of the output multiplier from this group range as high as 1.2 after 8 
quarters (Perotti, 2008) while the consumption multiplier is found to be as high as .49 after 8 
quarters (Gali et al., 2007), and generally is at least slightly positive. 
 Others have sought to understand the effect of anticipated fiscal policy in a structural 
VAR framework.  The narrative approach, pioneered by Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and 
discussed more extensively in chapter one, is an alternative to the Blanchard and Perotti 
methodology described above.  Identification is achieved by studying exogenous military 
buildups.  The authors use this approach to find a much smaller output multiplier (just .3 on 
impact) and a consumption multiplier that is essentially zero on impact and turns negative over 
                                                          
3
 These results are generally taken as support for sticky wage and price models like New Keynesian DSGE models 
that incorporate monopolistically competitive markets. 
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time.  Ramey (2011) extends the narrative approach by examining announced policy changes 
found in popular news outlets.  One concern that arises with the narrative approach is that the 
particular dates and news sources are chosen by the researcher and are therefore subjective. 
 A third approach to identifying fiscal policy shocks attempts to address both the 
subjectivity and the anticipation issues related to the previous two methods.  Fisher and Peters 
(2009) use statistical innovations to the accumulated excess stock returns for large US defense 
contractors to identify government spending shocks.  Like the narrative approach, the Fisher-
Peters methodology, sometimes referred to as the EVAR approach, begins by assuming there are 
periodic changes in current and expected military spending that are exogenous.  When such an 
episode occurs, the current and expected future earnings of companies receiving defense 
contracts should also change.  Profit expectations will be incorporated in the valuation of the 
stocks of these defense contractors, affecting the returns to holding these securities.  The authors 
find that after a positive excess return innovation output, hours, and consumption are constant for 
several quarters before rising in a hump-shaped pattern.   After an initial decline, wages rise 
persistently.  Taken as a whole, the results are closer to those typical of investigations using a 
Choleski decomposition to identify shocks to government spending. 
 I contribute to the above-described body of empirical literature in several ways.  First, I 
retrieved documents from Federal Reserve archives and compiled defense spending forecasts for 
the period 1965 – 2005 in order to bring a new data set to bear on the approach of Ramey.  The 
new data set creates a longer time series for government spending forecasts which allows for 
greater flexibility in the way that forecasts are incorporated in the VAR.  Specifically, there is no 
longer a need to combine disparate times series to create a sufficiently long sample.  This allows 
me to use both raw forecasts and forecast errors in the VAR.  Second, I extend Ramey’s 
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approach by analyzing VAR’s with stochastic as well as deterministic trends.   My final 
contribution comes from examining the possibility that the VAR is misspecified.  To this end, I 
use a structural DSGE model built to analyze fiscal policy to see if Fed forecasts are 
systematically related to the DSGE model residuals.  For each VAR discussed, I present impulse 








 The model presented in this chapter follows closely the neoclassical growth model 
presented in LPT.  The primary distinguishing feature is consumer heterogeneity in the form of 
two types of representative household.  The first household type displays optimizing behavior by 
maximizing an intertemporal utility function, henceforth referred to as Ricardian households 
(model variables are denoted with a superscript r).  The second type of representative agent 
exhibits rule-of-thumb, or non-Ricardian behavior.    Model variables pertaining to non-
Ricardian households are denoted with a superscript nr.  The model also contains a 
representative firm and the government.  The model economy is buffeted by nine temporary 
innovations: shocks to government spending, capital, labor, and consumption taxes, transfer 
payments, technology, investment adjustment costs, and preferences. 
 
1.1. Ricardian Households  
 A fraction of the population   [   ] is non-Ricardian.  The remaining      of 
households is Ricardian and maximizes expected utility.  Preferences, common to all 






























for   {    }.  Utility is derived from consumption, Jtc , relative to a habit stock defined as a 
fraction    [   ] of the previous period’s aggregate consumption, 1tC .  Hours worked, 
J
tl , 
yield disutility.  The utility function contains two preference shocks, one general (
b
tu ) and one 
specific to labor supply (
l
tu ).  The parameters       represent the coefficient of risk aversion 
and the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity respectively, and   [   ] is the discount 
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Ricardians have at their disposal after-tax labor and capital income, interest on government 
bonds held the previous period, and lump-sum transfer payments from the government, rtz .  
Income is consumed, invested in physical capital, or used to purchase government debt.  Capital 
income is computed as the rental rate of capital, ktR , multiplied by the effective quantity of 
capital employed by Ricardian households in period t, rttKv 1 .  The variable tv  is a household 
22 
 
control variable that measures the utilization rate of the capital stock.  1tR  
is the return on one-
year government debt owned by Ricardian households, rtb .  The tax rates on consumption, labor 
income, and capital income are given by ct ,
l
t , and 
k
t respectively.  It should be emphasized 
that only Ricardian households save and invest in physical capital and consider an intertemporal 
resource allocation decision. 


































The depreciation of the capital stock is assumed to depend positively on the intensity of capital 
utilization chosen by the household.  Specifically, the depreciation function      takes the 
quadratic form presented in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007):  
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The function      describes an adjustment cost associated with changing the level of investment 
from period t-1 to t.  As in Smets and Wouters  (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005),      
         in steady state, with         .  Following LPT, adjustment costs are subject to a 
shock i














The shock is designed to capture exogenous changes in the efficiency with which investment can 
be transformed into physical capital. 










tv  to maximize utility subject to the flow budget constraint (3) and the law of motion for capital 
(4).  The problem is solved using dynamic programming.  Details of the solution including first 
order conditions can be found in appendix A.  
 
2.1. Non-Ricardian Households 
 The response of consumption to fluctuations in income depends on the particular 
specification of non-Ricardian households. A mild departure from Ricardian behavior (Coenen, 
McAdams, and Straub (2008), for example) assumes households lack access to capital markets, 
but can still smooth consumption by adjusting money balances.  I choose to follow the original 
specification of Cambell and Mankiw (1989), and more recently, Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés  
(2007) and Forni, Monteforte, and Sessa (2009) by assuming non-Ricardian households are 
constrained to consume all of their current after-tax income.  These rule-of–thumb agents are 
allowed to co-exist with the traditional optimizing households.  While this specification is 
admittedly somewhat extreme with respect to the response of consumption to variations in 
income, it does not constrain the response of consumption to be positive.   
Formally, a fraction   [   ] of households lack access to financial and capital markets 
and must consume all current disposable income.  Income is derived from working (taxed at rate 
  
 ) and lump-sum transfers from the government, nrtz .  Consumption expenditures are subject to 
taxation at rate   
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2.3 Labor Supply 
 The issue of labor supply merits some discussion.  When modeling non-Ricardian 
households it is common to make assumptions than ensure hours worked are the same for both 
types of consumer.  In the monopolistically competitive market structures found in many DSGE 
models, it is often assumed that households will always supply enough labor to satisfy firm 
demand (see, for example, Forni et al.  (2009)
4
 and Leeper et al. (2012)).  Assuming wage rates 
are equal across household types and firms do not discriminate between labor types, the total 
supply of labor services by Ricardians and non-Ricardians will be identical in equilibrium.  In 
other words, the number of hours worked is demand driven.  However, this assumption has the 
side effect of constraining each household type to adjust hours in the same way after a shock.  
Therefore, a shock that creates a negative wealth effect for Ricardians and induces an increase in 
hours worked will also lead non-Ricardians to supply more labor, even though the shock may 
increase current disposable income and consumption (thereby decreasing the marginal utility of 
consumption for non-Ricardians)—a situation that not only contradicts intratemporal 
optimization requirements, but also exaggerates the aggregate demand effect of government 
spending and transfers shocks.  
                                                          
4 Forni et al. (2009) also consider a more general labor market specification in which non-Ricardians do not fully 
inherit the labor supply consequences from the wealth of Ricardians by exploring a union bargaining model.  They 




 To address this issue, I first assume a perfectly competitive labor market with the 
restriction that   
    
        I then observe the effect of relaxing this assumption, allowing for 
different levels of consumption and labor supply for Ricardians and non-Ricardians.  The 
unrestricted formulation is similar that of Galí et al. (2007), where non-Ricardians cannot 
optimize intertemporally, but can still adjust hours to solve a static optimization problem taking 
their budget constraint as given.  Temporarily ignoring taxes, the problem becomes: 
 
                 
 
                    
 




 are familiar: 
 
     
      
 
The intratemporal Euler equation for non-Ricardians then takes the form: 
 





In equilibrium, the optimality condition for non-Ricardians is identical to that of Ricardians 
except for the levels of consumption and labor supply.  Thus, the only way labor supply will be 
equalized across households is if the equilibrium level of consumption is also the same for both 
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Ricardians and non-Ricardians.  While not a perfect analog, the restricted model ensures that 
non-Ricardians adjust supply labor in the same manner as Ricardians after a fiscal shock, 
mimicking the behavior found is many medium-sized DSGE models. 
 
2.4 Firm Problem  
 The firm’s problem is straightforward profit maximization.  Profit is given as revenue 
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where ]1,0[  and atu  is a neutral technology shock assumed to follow an AR(1) process: 
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The first order conditions for the firm equate the rental rate of capital and the wage rate to the 

























2.5 Government Sector 
 As the focus of this paper is fiscal policy, several salient features of the model are found 
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where tG  and tZ are government spending and transfer payments respectively.  In addition to 
issuing debt, the government sources funds by levying capital, labor, and consumption taxes.  
Funds are used to service debt, purchase final goods and services, and redistribute wealth via 
lump-sum transfer payments.   
Fiscal instruments behave according to a rich specification that allows for a response to 
the state of the economy.  The fiscal rules capture two important policy considerations: business 
cycle stabilization and debt stabilization.  First, contemporaneous co-movement with output 
allows fiscal instruments to behave as automatic stabilizers, acting to bring the economy closer 
to potential GDP.  Second, fiscal instruments are allowed to respond to the level of the federal 
debt.  Higher government debt in period t will trigger fiscal responses in period t+1 that tend to 
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bring debt back to its steady state level.  Linearized, in terms of log-deviations from the steady 
state, the policy rules are: 
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where            {      } captures the fiscal response to deviations in output from 
potential GDP and            {        } models the response to government debt.  The 
consumption tax rate, largely capturing movement in excise taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and the 
like, is assumed to be an exogenous process.  Since excise taxes are used mainly for special 
funds, it is reasonable to believe they do not respond to changes in economic conditions.   
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Additionally, each fiscal instrument is subject to persistent, random shocks, represented 
in the model by the sut ' .  The coefficients on the lagged shocks (   [   ]       
{            }) measure the degree of persistence of an exogenous change in policy.  
Furthermore, exogenous changes in one tax instrument are allowed to affect the remaining tax 
instruments.  This response is quantified by the parameter          {        }. 
 
2.6 Aggregation 
 With a representative agent model, aggregate per capita quantities (denoted with a capital 
letter throughout the model) are equivalent to their representative counterparts in equilibrium:   
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Aggregate quantities of household variables are weighted averages of Ricardian and non-
Ricardian components: 
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(23) rtt IB )1(    
  
It is also assumed that both Ricardians and non-Ricardians receive the same transfer payments, 
so that   
    
      .  It is interesting to note that the definitions of aggregate consumption 
and aggregate labor supply (equations (19) and (20)) are the only places the parameter γ (the 
fraction of non-Ricardians) appears in the log-linearized model.  When    , the model 
collapses to the specification of LPT. 
  
2.7 Equilibrium and solution 
In equilibrium, aggregate supply equals aggregate demand for private consumption and 
investment goods and government purchases: 
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The non-Ricardian consumption function (7), first order conditions for the household (appendix 
A) and firm (11) and (12), the law of motion for capital (5), the government budget constraint 
(13), the fiscal policy rules (14) - (18), the additional exogenous processes given by (1), (2), (6), 
and (10), the definitions of aggregate household variables given by equations (19)-(23), and the 
aggregate resource constraint (24) characterize a symmetric equilibrium.  Additionally, the 
transversality condition for debt and capital accumulation must be satisfied.   
 The system is log-linearized around the deterministic steady state and solved using the 
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where the coefficient matrices      and B    are functions of the model’s structural parameters  
which will be estimated in the following section.  A complete characterization of the system of 




 Parameter identification has long been a concern when estimating DSGE models.  A 
straightforward type of identification issue, stochastic singularity, is rectified by including 
measurement errors or matching the number of shock processes to the number of observables.  
However, more delicate identification problems may arise in DSGE models that are not readily 
apparent.  Komunjer and Ng (2011) provide a relatively simple set of rank and order conditions 
that can be used prior to posterior simulation (for both stochastically singular and nonsingular 
models) to test whether the parameters of a DSGE model are identifiable from the first and 
second moments of the data, and state them in terms of a matrix     .  Using the Matlab code 
provided by Komunjer and Ng, I tested both the model presented in this paper and the LPT 
model for identifiability.  I first test the completely unrestricted model and find that nine 
restrictions are required for identification at all tolerance levels   .01.  I then imposed the nine 
restrictions used by LPT to find that the rank and order conditions are indeed satisfied for both 
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models at all tolerance levels   .01, indicating the parameters can be identified from the data5.   
Fixing the fraction of non-Ricardians and placing a restriction on hours worked does not affect 
the identification results.  See appendix B for details regarding the Komunjer and Ng test results.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
The model is fit to US data using Bayesian methods a la An and Schorfheide  (2007).  
The posterior distribution of the model is given as:  
 
   |      |       
 
where     |   is the likelihood of the data conditional on the parameters of the model and      
represents the prior distributions of the parameters.  The posterior distribution is simulated using 
the random walk Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm.  To execute the random walk MH 
algorithm, the mean and variance of the candidate distribution were initialized with the posterior 
mode and the inverse Hessian evaluated at the mode.  In order to find the posterior mode, I 
minimize the negative of the log posterior using the Sims csminwel optimization routine.  I 
performed fifty searches, each initialized with unique parameter values drawn at random from 
the prior distributions.  The search that yielded the largest likelihood was chosen as the posterior 
mode.  For the unrestricted model, I took 550,000 draws from the posterior, with the first 25,000 
draws discarded as a burn-in period.  The sample was thinned every 35
th
 draw, to arrive at a final 
sample size of 15,000.    The entire process was completed for both labor supply specifications.  
                                                          
5
 Calibrating the fraction of non-Ricardians simply adds an additional restriction, and does not affect the 
identifiability of the model. 
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The unrestricted model required a much longer MCMC chain to achieve statistical convergence
6
.  
I took 4.2 million draws from the posterior, with the first 1 million discarded as a burn-in.  The 
sample was thinned every 100
th
 draw to arrive at a final sample size of 32,000.  A tuning 
parameter value of .3 led to final acceptance ratios of .3589 and .3601 for the two models, which 
sit comfortably in the neighborhood of the optimal value (between .23 and .45, depending on the 
dimensionality of the system  (Koop, 2003)). 
To test for convergence of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo series and provide reasonable 
assurance that the entire posterior distribution was sampled, I examine autocorrelations, the 
Raftery-Lewis diagnostics (1995), and the Geweke chi-squared test (1992).  After burn-in and 
thinning, the Raftery-Lewis diagnostics indicate a sample sizes of only 1,249 and 998 are 
necessary for accurate parameter estimates and produced values of 1.333 and 1.065 for the I-
statistic (values less than 5 indicate convergence).  The Geweke test compares the means from 
the first 20% of the sample to the means from the last 50% of the sample, to see if an equilibrium 
has been reached.  A Z-test of the hypothesis of equality of these two means is carried out and 
the chi-squared marginal significance calculated.  The null cannot be rejected for α=.10 for 
nearly all of the parameters in both specifications.  A complete account of MCMC diagnostics is 
available upon request. 
 
3.3 Data 
 As in LPT, the study is necessarily limited to the behavior of federal government fiscal 
variables, for which data on the value of debt is readily available in the national income and 
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  I use quarterly data for the period 
1960Q1 to 2011Q4 for nine time series: consumption, 
investment, hours worked, government debt, government 
spending, capital tax revenues, labor tax revenues, 
consumption tax revenues, and government transfers.  The 
data are converted to real terms by dividing by the GDP 
deflator for personal consumption expenditures.  To make 
the data stationary, I linearly detrend the natural logarithm 
of each time series independently. The observables are 
related to the model via the following measurement equation: 
 
       
 
where    is the vector of the observable variables.  The matrix H maps the observables to the 
model variables.  A complete account of the data construction and sourcing can be found in 
appendix D. 
 
3.4 Priors and calibrated parameters 
  I calibrate nine parameters:       (implying a steady state interest rate of 4%),      
(which makes the steady state labor share of income approximately equal to 70%), and    
     (which implies an annual steady state depreciation rate of 10%).  The parameter    is 
                                                          
7
 As noted by Leeper et al. (2010), this would seem to hamper the investigation by limiting its scope, but focusing 
solely on federal debt dynamics may actually be preferable.  This is owed to the fact that federal, state, and local 
governments operate under very different fiscal constraints.  Specifically, many state governments are forced to 
operate under a balanced budget. 
 













calibrated to ensure that the capacity utilization, ν, is equal to unity in steady state.  Additionally, 
I set the steady state tax rates and the ratios of government spending and debt to output equal to 
the mean values of my data set, which can be found in table 1.  With respect to the fraction of 
non-Ricardian consumers, results for a variety of specifications are reported to ensure robustness. 
Based on empirical evidence, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) suggested 50% of consumers are 
non-Ricardian, while estimates from structural models generally range from 18% to 50% (see 
Traum and Yang, 2012, Cogan et al., 2010, and Forni et al., 2009 for examples).  In recognition 
of this uncertainty, I report results when the fraction of non-Ricardians (   is estimated from the 
data as well as for various calibrations of   with the remaining parameters being estimated.  
 
Table 2. Selected prior and posterior distributions 
 
Density Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Risk aversion ω Γ 2 0.5 2.317 0.450 2.262 0.409
Inverse Frisch elas. κ Γ 2 0.5 2.431 0.565 1.726 0.403
Habit formation h β 0.7 0.2 0.638 0.064 0.590 0.059
Capital util. costs δ2 Γ 0.7 0.2 0.444 0.114 0.493 0.127
Investment adj. costs s" Γ 5 0.25 5.636 0.264 5.651 0.264
Fraction of non-Ricardians γ β 0.5 0.1 0.207 0.039 0.200* -
Fiscal Policy
Govt. spending debt coeff. γg Γ 0.4 0.2 0.166 0.063 0.158 0.060
Capital tax debt coeff. γtk Γ 0.4 0.2 0.471 0.110 0.481 0.114
Labor tax debt coeff. γtl Γ 0.4 0.2 0.101 0.045 0.104 0.047
Transfer debt coeff. γz Γ 0.4 0.2 0.376 0.079 0.364 0.081
Capital tax Y coeff. ψtk Γ 1.25 0.3 2.214 0.318 2.217 0.324
Labor tax Y coeff. ψtl Γ 0.5 0.25 0.296 0.128 0.311 0.132
Govt. spending Y coeff. ψg Γ 0.07 0.05 0.063 0.044 0.060 0.041
Transfer Y coeff. ψz Γ 0.2 0.1 0.238 0.109 0.197 0.091
Cap./Labor co-term φkl N 0.25 0.1 0.199 0.030 0.202 0.029
Cap./cons. co-term φkc N 0.05 0.1 0.029 0.032 0.029 0.033
Labor/cons. co-term φlc N 0.05 0.1 -0.028 0.031 -0.027 0.031
* γ is calibrated to .20, the remaining parameters are estimated
Parameter








Table 3. Selected prior and posterior distributions 
 
Density Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Tech AR coeff. ρa β 0.85 0.1 0.968 0.012 0.969 0.011
Pref. AR coeff. ρb β 0.85 0.1 0.672 0.024 0.669 0.023
Labor AR coeff. ρl β 0.85 0.1 0.988 0.007 0.985 0.008
Invest. AR coeff. ρi β 0.85 0.1 0.647 0.056 0.690 0.051
Govt. spend. AR coeff. ρg β 0.85 0.1 0.971 0.012 0.971 0.012
Cap. tax AR coeff. ρtk β 0.85 0.1 0.941 0.021 0.941 0.022
Labor tax AR coeff. ρtl β 0.85 0.1 0.975 0.012 0.974 0.012
Cons. tax AR coeff. ρtc β 0.85 0.1 0.929 0.023 0.929 0.023
Transfer AR coeff. ρz β 0.85 0.1 0.934 0.022 0.935 0.022
Tech std. σa ΙΓ* 1 4 0.616 0.031 0.620 0.031
Pref. std. σb ΙΓ* 1 4 10.069 0.621 9.875 0.596
Labor std. σl ΙΓ* 1 4 3.682 0.628 2.874 0.445
Invest. std. σi ΙΓ* 1 4 8.432 0.808 8.536 0.897
Govt. spend std. σg ΙΓ* 1 4 3.034 0.151 3.029 0.149
Cap. tax std. σtk ΙΓ* 1 4 4.214 0.170 4.311 0.213
Labor tax std. σtl ΙΓ* 1 4 2.862 0.143 2.868 0.145
Cons. std. σtc ΙΓ* 1 4 4.036 0.199 4.046 0.201
Transfer std. σz ΙΓ* 1 4 3.281 0.163 3.284 0.162
* The parameters for the Inverse Gamma distribution correspond to **Results where  γ is calibrated to .20
Posterior Distribution 
Restricted Labor SupplyParameter
Posterior Distribution  
Unrestricted Labor Supply**
Prior Distribution
                                     
  
 
When   is estimated, a beta distribution with mean .5 and standard deviation .1 is chosen for the 
prior, following Forni et al. (2009). Tables 2 and 3 show the prior distributions for the 
remaining parameters to be estimated.  The prior distributions are those found commonly in the 
literature, and are chosen to reflect prior estimates from studies conducted LPT, Forni et al.  
(2009), and Smets and Wouters  (2003) among others.  Generally speaking, the priors are 
somewhat diffuse, allowing for a wide range of parameter estimates.  The habit persistence 
parameter (h) is assumed to be distributed Beta, with mean .7 and standard deviation .2, 
following Forni et al. (2009).  For the risk-aversion parameter   and the inverse of the Frisch 
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elasticity  , a Gamma distribution is chosen with a mean of 2 and standard deviation of .5. The 
capital utilization adjustment parameter    is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution with mean 
.7 and standard deviation .2, centered more tightly around the estimates of Schmit-Grohe and 
Uribe (2007) than those used by LPT.  With respect to the shock processes, Beta distributions are 
used for the autoregressive coefficients (   ), with a mean and standard deviation of .85 and .1 
respectively, as in Smets and Wouters (2003).  The standard deviations of the innovations are 
assumed to be distributed inverse gamma, while the investment adjustment coefficient s” has a 
Gamma distribution with a mean of 5 and standard deviation set to .25.  The priors over the fiscal 
variables closely follow LPT, and are designed to cover the range of prior estimates found in 
Blanchard and Perotti  (2002), Giorni et al.  (1995), and Yang  (2005), among others.  A Gamma 
distribution was chosen for the parameters governing the response of fiscal variables to debt 
(    ), with a mean of .4 and standard deviation of .2.  The   iscal response to changes in the 
output gap (    ) are also distributed Gamma.  The Blanchard and Perotti  (2002) estimate of the 
elasticity of tax revenue with respect to output implies a value of unity for     and    .
8
.  Leeper 
et al. (2010) estimate a value for     that ranges between 1.4 and 1.7, while     is estimated to 
be between .33 and .38.  The lower value of     reflects the fact that Social Security taxes (which 
are capped and regressive) are incorporated in the labor tax revenue data.  Accordingly, I set the 
labor tax rate elasticity to have a mean and standard deviation of 0.5 and 0.25, and the capital tax 
rate elasticity to have a mean and standard deviation of 1.25 and 0.3.  The prior for the 
coefficient measuring the co-movement between output and government spending (  ) is 
assigned a mean of .07 and standard deviation .05 while the coefficient on transfers (    is 
assumed to have mean and standard deviation of .2 and .1 respectively.  The parameter 
                                                          
8
 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find that a 1% increase in output leads to a 2.08% increase in tax revenue for the 
period 1947Q1-1997Q4, which implies an increase of approximately 1% in the average tax rate 
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measuring the co-movement between the capital and labor tax rate shocks (   ) is assumed to 
have a Normal distribution with a mean of 0.25 and a standard deviation   of 0.1.  Yang  (2005) 
estimates     to be 0.26, in line with the findings of LPT which range from .15 to .19.  The 
parameters measuring the co-movement between the capital and consumption tax rate shocks and 
between the labor and consumption tax rate shocks (   and     ) are assumed to have a Normal 
distribution with a mean of 0.05 and a standard deviation of 0.1.  There is very little information 
to guide the choice of priors for     and    , but the chosen values encompass the values 
estimated by LPT (.024 and -.028, in the best fitting model).  Since consumption taxes are 
mainly used for special funds, the effect is expected to be small. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Estimation Results 
 Tables 2 and 3 report the primary estimation results, including the means and standard 
deviations of the model’s parameters.  Nearly all of the parameters are meaningfully different 
from zero, with the interaction terms between consumption tax rates and capital/labor tax rates 
(φkc and φlc respectively) being the lone exceptions.  Plots of the prior and posterior 
distributionsof the parameters can be found in appendix C.  The prior and posterior plots 
corroborate the formal identification test, as shown by the fact that either the posterior 
distribution is not centered on the prior or it is centered but with a smaller dispersion for most of 
the parameters.  When labor supply is equalized across household types, the fraction of non-
Ricardians is estimated to be .207.  This estimate is on the low end of what is found in the 
literature, but not unreasonable.  When allowing for intratemporal optimization by non-Ricardian 
households, the fraction of non-Ricardians is estimated to be .70, a figure that is quite large 
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compared to just previous findings
9
.  To provide a meaningful comparison between the two 
model specifications, I therefore focus on the results when  =.20 for both labor supply 
assumptions
10
, and then explore how the results change as the fraction on non-Ricardians 
increases to .70.   With respect to the remaining structural parameters, the parameter 
estimates are very similar across the two labor supply specifications.  The intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution (1/ω) and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (1/ κ) are similar to estimates 
generally found in the literature.  The posterior means values of (1/ω) are .43 and .44 for the two 
specifications.   The unrestricted model generated a somewhat larger value for the Frisch 
elasticity (.58 compared to .41) and a slightly smaller habit stock parameter (.59 compared to 
.64).  Relative to the results of LPT, the external habit stock is larger
11
 but similar to the 67% 
reported by Cogan et al. (2010) for a model that includes non-Ricardian consumers.  Most of the 
shocks are quite persistent, with estimated AR(1) coefficients greater than .9.  The general 
preference shock (ρb) and the investment adjustment cost shock (ρi) are somewhat less persistent 
with AR(1) parameters estimates in the range of .65 to .7. 
 An inspection of the fiscal policy parameters reveals several interesting findings.  Under 
both labor supply specifications, the fiscal policy estimates are nearly identical.  The results 
indicate that historically an increase in government debt triggers several fiscal instruments to 
adjust.  Capital taxes and transfers react most strongly to debt innovations, while government 
spending and labor tax adjustments are smaller but nontrivial.  In contrast to the findings of LPT, 
the addition of non-Ricardian households leads distortionary capital taxes to react more strongly 
than transfers.   The attenuated response of transfers to debt also results in a stronger response 
                                                          
9
 For both model specifications, several priors over the fraction of non-Ricardians were tested, including a uniform 
prior.  Estimates did not differ significantly. 
10
 For the unrestricted model, this entails fixing       and estimating the remaining parameters. 
11
 LPT estimated h to be .5 for all model specifications 
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from labor taxes, while government spending tends to decrease
12
 less in the face of a debt 
buildup than found by LPT.  Capital taxes are extremely procyclical, as evidenced by the large 
response to changes in aggregate output.  Labor taxes and transfers are also procyclical, albeit 
less dramatically than taxes on capital, while government spending changes does not appear to 
be a significant automatic stabilizer.  Transfers respond to output slightly less when labor supply 
is unrestricted.  In comparison to the findings of LPT, capital taxes and transfers react more 
strongly to fluctuations in output while labor taxes are significantly less responsive. Additionally, 
exogenous changes to capital and labor tax rates tend to occur together, as the capital-labor tax 
comovement term is positive and different from zero.  Meanwhile, there appears to be little or no 
comovement of consumption tax rates with either capital or labor taxes.  As LPT point out, this 
seems to indicate that Congress jointly considers changes in labor and capital taxes while 
consumption taxes are little used in concert with other tax instruments to affect changes in the 
economy’s fiscal disposition. 
 
4.2 Impulse Responses 
 The impulse response functions for a one standard deviation shock to each fiscal 
instrument are plotted in figures 1-10.  The solid line is the response generated using the 





percentile of the posterior.  Each figure shows the path of nine endogenous variables following 
the fiscal shock.  Time is measured on the x-axis in years. 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the effect of a one standard deviation increase in government 
spending.  Under both labor supply specifications the response of Ricardian households is 
                                                          
12
 Note that all of the fiscal policy parameters are positive since sign restrictions are imposed in the fiscal policy 
rules, equations (13)-(17). 
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standard: an increase in government spending raises the interest rate and crowds out investment 
spending.  Furthermore, the shock creates a negative wealth effect which induces households to 
compensate by increasing work effort.  When labor supply is restricted, the increase in hours 
worked spans both types of households, leading to an increase in aggregate output.  The response 
of output allows for a path that remains above steady-state for ten years, even as Ricardian 
households continue to reduce investment spending in response to higher capital taxes.  The 
reduction in the expected present value of income also induces optimizing households to reduce 
consumption.  In contrast, non-Ricardian households experience no such negative wealth effect 
on impact.  The increased work effort leads to greater disposable income and higher 
consumption initially.  This offsetting effect leads to a smaller reduction in aggregate 
 
Figure 1. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in government spending, with 
restricted labor supply.  The solid line is the mean response; the dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th 


















































consumption than would be seen if all agents were fully rational.  However, this effect is short 
lived.  The increase in debt that results from the spending increase is financed in part by higher 
labor taxes, which reduces disposable income for non-Ricardians (an effect fully anticipated by 
Ricardians).  Non-Ricardian income is further reduced as the part of the debt is retired by a 
decrease in transfer payments.  After a few years, the paths of Ricardian and non-Ricardian 
consumption are very similar. In contrast, the behavior of non-Ricardians is markedly different 
when labor supply is unrestricted.  Without inheriting the negative wealth effect of Ricardians, 
there is no immediate increase in hours worked.  It is only after tax rates respond to the increased 
government debt that Ricardians respond to lower disposable income by decreasing consumption 
and increasing hours worked, at which time Ricardian hours are already returning to steady state.  
 
Figure 2. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in government spending, with 
unrestricted labor supply.  The solid line is the mean response; the dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th 

















































As a result, the path of aggregate hours is smoother than would be without the presence of non-
Ricardians.  Without the immediate boost in non-Ricardian hours worked and consumption, it 
follows that, upon impact, the aggregate demand effect of a government spending shock is 
weaker when labor supply is unrestricted.    
 Figures 3 and 4 present the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the capital tax 
rate.  Established theory predicts a contemporaneous decrease in investment, labor hours, and 
output.  The benefit of saving and investing is diminished, inducing optimizing households to 
trade current for future consumption.  However, standard theory does not hold with 
heterogeneous households and the rich fiscal policy rules estimated in this paper.  Since capital 
 
Figure 3. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in capital taxes, with restricted 


















































and labor taxes are positively related, the increase in capital taxes also ushers in higher labor 
taxes which reduces work effort in Ricardian households and causes a reduction in consumption 
on impact.  As debt is retired and output lingers below steady state, Ricardian households expect 
a concomitant fall in capital and labor taxes.  This increases work effort and investment after a 
few years, bringing output closer to its steady state value.  With restricted labor supply, this 
effect is inherited by non-Ricardian households but is quickly offset as the reduction in 
government debt leads to an increase in transfer payments and a decrease in labor taxes that 
boosts disposable income.  The result is an increase in non-Ricardian consumption that 
diminishes as debt returns to steady state, but remains positive throughout the transition period.
 With unrestricted labor supply, non-Ricardians increase labor supply to compensate for 
lower income and consumption upon impact.  This effect is reversed as transfers increase and 
capital and labor taxes decrease as a result of debt being retired.  The subsequent increase in 
income causes non-Ricardians to consume more and work less.  As debt returns to steady state, 
hours worked and consumption follow suit but stay below steady state for many years as output 
remains lower. 
 The effect of a one standard deviation increase in the labor tax rate is illustrated in figures 
5 and 6.  The response of Ricardian households, as expected, is to reduce hours worked which 
leads to lower income, consumption, and output on impact.  In contrast, non-Ricardians increase 
consumption shortly after impact when labor supply is restricted.  This is owed to the fact that 
hours begin to increase after a few periods and the reduction in after-tax labor income is offset 
by higher transfers.  As debt is retired labor taxes begin to fall, transfers continue to increase, and 
output recovers, further boosting non-Ricardian consumption.  The paths of investment and 
output allow for a variety of outcomes, reflecting the underlying uncertainty in the path of 
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government debt.  Unlike LPT, the impulse responses for the non-Ricardian model presented 
here allow for output to climb above steady state after a few periods.  Standard theory predicts a 
decrease in investment with a reduction in labor supply as the returns to capital decline.  This 
effect is enhanced in this model since capital and labor taxes are correlated and even further 
bolstered when output is above steady state, triggering an automatic stabilizer.  However, in the 
model presented here investment can rise above or fall below steady state as several 
interconnected relationships play out.  As debt decreases over several periods, capital taxes also 
decrease, stimulating investment.  This effect is enhanced if output stays below steady state, 
which further reduces the capital tax and may lead to a substantial overall increase in investment.  
 When the restriction on labor supply is removed, non-Ricardians again behave differently  
 
Figure 4. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in capital taxes, with unrestricted 




















































than in the restricted model.  As one might expect, the labor tax shock causes non-Ricardian 
consumption to be lower on impact.  However, labor hours actually increase after an increase in 
labor taxes.  All else equal, non-Ricardian labor supply is inversely related to both consumption 
and the labor tax rate.  It must be that the increased marginal utility of consumption is enough 
incentive to increase hours worked, even in the face of rising taxes.  The resulting aggregate 
labor impulse response function is remarkably smooth as the labor supply decisions of the two   
household types cancel each other out.  As with the capital tax innovation, as debt is retired both 
capital and labor taxes fall which boosts disposable income and consumption. 
 
Figure 5. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in labor taxes, with restricted labor 



















































 Figures 7 and 8 show the impulse response resulting from a one standard deviation 
increase in transfer payments.  Similar to a government spending innovation, the increase in 
transfers creates a negative wealth effect, inducing an increase in hours worked for Ricardians.  
Since transfer payments enter directly into the consumption function of non-Ricardian 
households, these agents display an increase in consumption that is amplified significantly by the 
increase in hours worked inherited from Ricardians.  Contrary to the fully rational model of LPT, 
the effect creates a much larger response of aggregate consumption in the short run, enough to 
push output above steady state upon impact.  The mild stimulus is reversed shortly thereafter 
though as the transfers are financed by higher debt that must be retired via capital and labor  
 
Figure 6. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in labor taxes, with unrestricted 



















































taxes.  This eventually induces a reduction in hours worked and investment spending, causing 
output to fall below steady state.  When labor supply is not restricted, the increase in transfers 
boosts non-Ricardian consumption, but by a much smaller amount.  The increase in current 
disposable income leads non-Ricardians to trade off consumption for leisure rather than 
increasing hours worked like Ricardians.   Even though aggregate consumption rises, output falls 
below steady state for many years after the innovation as investment is crowded out upon impact 
and further reduced as debt is retired in part through higher capital taxes.   
 Finally, the responses to an increase in the consumption tax rate are displayed in figures 9  
 
Figure 7. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in transfers, with restricted labor 


















































and 10. Since consumption taxes represent such a small percentage of tax revenue collected, all 
effects are mild. As expected, Ricardian consumption is reduced in the face of an increase in 
consumption taxes. Investment rises as consumers save more, spend less, and enjoy reduced 
capital taxes.  When labor supply is restricted, non-Ricardian consumption actually rises slightly 
above steady-state after an increase in consumption taxes.  This is owed to an increase in transfer  
payments and a reduction in labor taxes that results from paying down government debt, coupled 
with an increase in work effort induced by the negative wealth effect experienced by Ricardians.  
In the unrestricted model, the effect is similar to the response after a labor tax shock in that 
consumption decreases in the face of lower after-tax income, inducing greater work effort. 
 
Figure 8. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in transfers, with unrestricted 
labor supply.  The solid line is the mean response; the dashed lines represent the 5th and 95th percentile of 


















































Figure 9. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in consumption taxes, 
with restricted labor supply.  The solid line is the mean response; the dashed lines represent the 5th 
















































Figure 10. Estimated impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in consumption taxes, 
with unrestricted labor supply.  The solid line is the mean response; the dashed lines represent the 

















































4.3 Present-Value Multipliers 
 Throughout the fiscal policy literature, the quantitative effects of fiscal adjustments are 
commonly reported via Keynesian-style multipliers.  It is less common though to report 
multipliers in terms of present discounted value.  Following Mountford and Uhlig (2008) and 
LPT, I report present-value multipliers, which provide a more accurate assessment of the costs 
and benefits of fiscal adjustments that affect the economy well into the future.  Present-value 
multipliers represent the present value of the change in a model variable over a k-period horizon 
that is induced by a change in a fiscal instrument (in this case, a one standard deviation shock).  
For instance, the present value of the change in output in response to a change in government 
spending is calculated as: 
  ∑ (∏     
   
   )
 
        
  ∑ (∏     
   
   )
 
        
 
 
Results are reported in tables 4 and 5.  The impact multiplier is given for k = 0, while the 
cumulative, or long-run effect is given as k approaches infinity.  In addition to point estimates for 




 percentile of the posterior distribution.  This practice 
provides a more accurate characterization of the uncertainty inherent in the estimation process
13
. 
 Generally speaking, the multipliers reported here are similar to those found by LPT, with 
a few noteworthy differences.  As is typical with real business cycle models (see Uhlig (2010) 
for another example), the government spending present-value multipliers for output reported in 
both studies tend to be somewhat smaller than typically found in the empirical literature.  With 
restricted labor supply, I find the multiplier ranges from .63 to .76 upon impact; however, unlike 
those reported by LPT, the mean multiplier turns negative in the long run as the increased gov- 
                                                          
13
 A special thanks to Nora Traum for a useful comment regarding this matter. 
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Table 4. Present-value multipliers for various time horizons.  Estimates at the 5th percentile (top row), mean 
(bold type), and 95th percentile (bottom row) of the posterior.  For the case of unrestricted labor supply. 
Impact 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters Impact 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters
0.577 0.299 0.133 -0.013 -0.303 -0.226 -0.303 -0.317 -0.329 -0.352
0.634 0.386 0.232 0.133 -0.064 -0.159 -0.186 -0.177 -0.158 -0.135
0.701 0.491 0.349 0.289 0.167 -0.102 -0.087 -0.052 0.012 0.125
-0.289 -0.409 -0.445 -0.531 -0.822 -0.231 -0.382 -0.444 -0.481 -0.491
-0.242 -0.342 -0.364 -0.436 -0.670 -0.175 -0.296 -0.340 -0.365 -0.355
-0.194 -0.276 -0.291 -0.350 -0.527 -0.134 -0.232 -0.265 -0.281 -0.242
-0.155 -0.336 -0.452 -0.558 -0.530 -0.015 -0.034 -0.052 -0.074 -0.067
-0.124 -0.272 -0.361 -0.431 -0.395 0.015 0.040 0.054 0.063 0.058
-0.089 -0.194 -0.254 -0.295 -0.263 0.055 0.137 0.194 0.246 0.238
-0.212 -0.366 -0.508 -0.790 -1.250 -0.068 -0.251 -0.411 -0.670 -1.031
-0.159 -0.247 -0.327 -0.514 -0.791 -0.045 -0.191 -0.324 -0.521 -0.704
-0.125 -0.168 -0.207 -0.328 -0.504 -0.031 -0.150 -0.266 -0.425 -0.519
-0.113 -0.185 -0.225 -0.365 -0.807 0.008 0.025 0.031 -0.022 -0.254
-0.076 -0.104 -0.102 -0.176 -0.495 0.015 0.064 0.104 0.094 -0.059
-0.048 -0.037 0.000 -0.037 -0.297 0.028 0.111 0.185 0.218 0.131
-0.125 -0.366 -0.591 -0.861 -0.878 -0.094 -0.254 -0.397 -0.579 -0.605
-0.084 -0.253 -0.421 -0.624 -0.602 -0.059 -0.166 -0.260 -0.355 -0.340







Government spending present-value multipliers
Capital tax present-value multipliers
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Table 5. Present-value multipliers for various time horizons.  Estimates at the 5th percentile (top row), mean 
(bold type), and 95th percentile (bottom row) of the posterior.  For the case of restricted labor supply. 
 
Impact 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters Impact 5 quarters 10 quarters 25 quarters
0.627 0.318 0.146 -0.070 -0.374 -0.195 -0.195 -0.165 -0.153 -0.200
0.684 0.405 0.248 0.068 -0.156 -0.131 -0.077 -0.018 0.029 0.036
0.755 0.517 0.382 0.241 0.091 -0.067 0.058 0.158 0.265 0.389
-0.223 -0.352 -0.429 -0.574 -0.869 -0.197 -0.271 -0.281 -0.271 -0.290
-0.171 -0.285 -0.352 -0.474 -0.732 -0.146 -0.179 -0.160 -0.133 -0.136
-0.114 -0.215 -0.276 -0.381 -0.581 -0.112 -0.104 -0.055 -0.006 0.034
-0.184 -0.383 -0.494 -0.580 -0.558 -0.023 -0.061 -0.104 -0.161 -0.157
-0.145 -0.311 -0.400 -0.458 -0.424 0.014 0.029 0.026 0.007 -0.0003
-0.104 -0.224 -0.286 -0.319 -0.286 0.075 0.166 0.212 0.244 0.232
-0.203 -0.265 -0.322 -0.497 -0.900 0.058 -0.057 -0.206 -0.460 -0.797
-0.157 -0.162 -0.173 -0.294 -0.585 0.112 0.027 -0.112 -0.324 -0.512
-0.127 -0.094 -0.081 -0.164 -0.348 0.169 0.100 -0.045 -0.249 -0.357
-0.103 -0.092 -0.056 -0.098 -0.490 0.116 0.200 0.225 0.180 -0.041
-0.071 -0.014 0.069 0.080 -0.232 0.178 0.296 0.333 0.301 0.148
-0.048 0.052 0.179 0.235 -0.045 0.250 0.402 0.449 0.423 0.320
-0.119 -0.347 -0.564 -0.841 -0.882 -0.096 -0.262 -0.401 -0.559 -0.585
-0.087 -0.262 -0.442 -0.669 -0.666 -0.065 -0.186 -0.285 -0.370 -0.358
-0.066 -0.197 -0.334 -0.507 -0.482 -0.044 -0.128 -0.190 -0.215 -0.195
Government spending present-value multipliers
Capital tax present-value multipliers
∆C
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ernment debt is retired in part by levying distortionary taxes.  The discrepancy is due to slightly 
more crowding out of investment and consumption expenditures.  Even with the increased crowd 
out of consumption in the long run, the consumption multiplier upon impact is less negative than 
found by LPT, bringing the model’s findings closer to empirical results that generally put the 
multiplier slightly above zero.  Whether or not a larger fraction of Ricardian consumers can bring 
the consumption multiplier above zero will be examined below.  In the unrestricted model, the 
initial effect upon aggregate demand is smaller and the consumption multiplier more negative 
since non-Ricardians do not experience a negative wealth effect, and only increase hours worked 
gradually over time.  The long-run government spending multipliers vary little with the 
specification of labor supply. 
 The mean capital and labor tax multipliers on output have the expected negative signs 
upon impact.  In each case the tax multiplier for output is modest upon impact, significantly 
smaller than the government spending multipliers. The long-run capital tax multiplier is much 
larger in absolute value than the impact multiplier, reflecting the harmful effect the taxation has 
on investment and capital accumulation over a longer time horizon.  In the restricted model the 
long-run effect on output is smaller than reported by LPT, as the presence of rule of thumb 
consumers dampened consumption crowd out substantially.  The unrestricted model produced 
multipliers that are nearly identical to those found by LPT.  The consumption multiplier is more 
strongly negative, which leads to a long-run output multiplier of nearly -.8.    
In both labor supply scenarios the long-run labor tax multiplier is slightly positive at the 
mean, but not significantly different from zero as displayed by the 95% confidence set.  This 
result stands in contrast to the findings of LPT who report a long-run multiplier of -.21.  When 
non-Ricardians are allowed to optimize intratemporally, the long-run mean multiplier on output 
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turns negative as more consumption is lost.  In both cases there appears to be a small amount of 
crowding-in of investment following a labor tax shock, which keeps output close to its steady 
state value.  In each case the decrease in government debt that accompanies the tax shock 
triggers more wealth redistribution in the form of transfer payments, off-setting the decrease in 
disposable income and stimulating non-Ricardian consumption. 
Perhaps the most interesting results are found in the transfers multipliers.  In the case of 
restricted labor supply, non-Ricardian consumers increase consumption dramatically with the 
increase in current disposable income, causing aggregate consumption to increase in the short 
and long run.  The effect is large enough to create a positive output multiplier upon impact.  
However, the stimulus is short lived; the increase in debt created by larger transfer payments 
triggers an increase in distortionary taxation and a decrease in government spending that brings 
the output multiplier below zero after ten quarters, and markedly negative in the long run.  Since 
the data indicate that capital taxes react most strongly to debt, investment and capital 
accumulation suffer in the long run.  In the unrestricted specification, consumption is not boosted 
nearly as much since non-Ricardians choose to work fewer hours with the increase in income.  
As a result, the output multiplier is negative on impact and more strongly negative in the long 
run. 
 
4.4 Fraction of non-Ricardian Consumers 
 As mentioned above, previous estimates of the fraction of non-Ricardians vary 
substantially.  In this paper, when labor supply is restricted the estimate is 20% while the 
unrestricted specification yields an estimate of 70%.  Therefore, it is important to explore how 




studies is the effect of government spending shocks on consumption and investment.  Standard 
real business cycle analysis produces negative consumption and investment multipliers after a 
government spending shock, but this seems to be at odds with much of the empirical evidence.
14
   
Can a high enough proportion of non-Ricardians generate a positive consumption multiplier, 
even without nominal rigidities and/or central bank intervention?  To what extent does the 
fraction of non-Ricardians affect investment crowd out and capital accumulation?  To help 
answer these questions, tables 6 and 7 report fiscal multipliers for various values of γ, holding all 
other parameters constant at their estimated values based on the posterior mean.  
 As the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers approaches 70% in the restricted model, the  
                                                          
14
 For a discussion of this topic, see Galí et al., 2007 
 
Table 4. Present-value multipliers for various fractions of non-Ricardian consumers, with  restricted labor supply.  




impact LR impact LR impact LR impact LR impact LR impact LR
∆Y 0.68 -0.16 0.72 -0.15 0.77 -0.14 0.82 -0.13 0.88 -0.12 0.95 -0.11
∆C -0.17 -0.73 -0.12 -0.73 -0.07 -0.73 -0.004 -0.72 0.07 -0.72 0.16 -0.71
∆I -0.15 -0.42 -0.16 -0.42 -0.17 -0.42 -0.18 -0.41 -0.19 -0.41 -0.20 -0.40
∆Y -0.16 -0.58 -0.16 -0.52 -0.16 -0.45 -0.16 -0.37 -0.17 -0.28 -0.17 -0.19
∆C -0.07 -0.23 -0.07 -0.12 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.13 -0.09 0.27 -0.10 0.41
∆I -0.09 -0.67 -0.08 -0.71 -0.08 -0.77 -0.08 -0.82 -0.08 -0.87 -0.08 -0.92
∆Y -0.13 0.04 -0.12 0.11 -0.11 0.19 -0.10 0.28 -0.08 0.38 -0.06 0.49
∆C -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.04 -0.14 0.07 -0.14 0.18 -0.13 0.31 -0.12 0.44
∆I 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.11 0.06 -0.14
∆Y 0.11 -0.51 0.18 -0.49 0.27 -0.47 0.37 -0.44 0.49 -0.41 0.63 -0.42
∆C 0.18 0.15 0.27 0.21 0.37 0.27 0.49 0.34 0.63 0.41 0.80 0.48
∆I -0.07 -0.36 -0.08 -0.40 -0.10 -0.44 -0.12 -0.47 -0.14 -0.51 -0.16 -0.54
Government spending present-value multipliers
Capital tax present-value multipliers
Labor tax present-value multipliers
Transfers present-value multipliers




output multiplier upon impact following a spending shock approaches unity.  The increased 
stimulus is a result of less consumption crowd-out since non-Ricardians do not anticipate future 
tax increases to retire the new government debt.  At a value of γ slightly higher than .5, roughly 
the fraction suggested by Campbell and Mankiw (1989), the consumption response does in fact 
become positive.  This matters little though in the end: long-run multipliers vary only slightly as 
both consumer types eventually respond to the retirement of debt via distortionary taxes and 
reduced transfers.  This effect is mirrored in the responses of consumption and output to a 
change in transfers.  As the fraction of non-Ricardians increases, an increase in transfers will 
generate a larger short-run stimulus.  The consumption multiplier peaks as .8 while the output 
multiplier reaches .63 upon impact, considerably larger than the baseline estimates.  The long-
 
Table 5. Present-value multipliers for various fractions of non-Ricardian consumers, with  unrestricted labor 





impact LR impact LR impact LR impact LR impact LR impact LR
∆Y 0.634 -0.064 0.62 -0.05 0.61 -0.04 0.60 -0.03 0.58 0.00 0.55 0.03
∆C -0.242 -0.670 -0.24 -0.67 -0.24 -0.66 -0.24 -0.66 -0.24 -0.65 -0.24 -0.65
∆I -0.124 -0.395 -0.13 -0.39 -0.15 -0.38 -0.16 -0.37 -0.19 -0.35 -0.22 -0.32
∆Y -0.159 -0.791 -0.15 -0.84 -0.14 -0.89 -0.13 -0.97 -0.12 -1.07 -0.10 -1.20
∆C -0.076 -0.495 -0.08 -0.51 -0.08 -0.53 -0.08 -0.55 -0.08 -0.58 -0.08 -0.63
∆I -0.084 -0.602 -0.08 -0.63 -0.07 -0.67 -0.06 -0.72 -0.04 -0.78 -0.02 -0.87
∆Y -0.159 -0.135 -0.14 -0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.01
∆C -0.175 -0.355 -0.18 -0.35 -0.18 -0.34 -0.18 -0.33 -0.18 -0.31 -0.17 -0.30
∆I 0.015 0.058 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.15
∆Y -0.045 -0.704 -0.06 -0.74 -0.08 -0.78 -0.10 -0.84 -0.13 -0.91 -0.18 -0.99
∆C 0.015 -0.059 0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.13
∆I -0.059 -0.340 -0.08 -0.36 -0.09 -0.38 -0.12 -0.40 -0.16 -0.42 -0.21 -0.42
Government spending present-value multipliers
Capital tax present-value multipliers
Labor tax present-value multipliers
Transfers present-value multipliers
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
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run multiplier remains negative however, and varies little with changes in γ.  
 When labor supply is unrestricted, there are two surprising results after a government 
spending innovation.  First, there is no tendency for the impact multiplier on consumption to 
increase with the fraction of non-Ricardians.  This is the case since both Ricardians and non-
Ricardians initially respond in essentially the same way to a spending shock, by reducing 
consumption.  Second, the output multiplier after a capital tax shock tends to decrease as gamma 
increases.  In the long-run, the output multiplier in the restricted model is nearly double that of 
the unrestricted model.  This happens because the wealth effect is no longer inherited from 
Ricardians, leading aggregate hours to increase less after the shock.  When the fraction of non-
Ricardians reaches .70, the government spending multipliers are similar to those reported by LPT 
for the fully rational model. 
 The effect of a capital tax shocks also intensifies as the fraction of non-Ricardians 
increases in the unrestricted specification.  The long-run investment multiplier approaches -.9, 
while the mean response of output to a capital tax innovation is -1.2 —significantly larger than 
both the restricted model in this paper and the fully rational model when all instruments adjust.  
The primary driver of this discrepancy is the consumption multiplier after the capital tax shock.  
In the unrestricted model, non-Ricardian consumption declines substantially in the long run.  The 
long-run output multiplier after a transfers innovation is also larger, owed to more investment 
crowd-out throughout the transition period as capital taxes finance deficit spending.  The 
multiplier approaches unity as the fraction of non-Ricardians reaches 70 percent. 
 
4.5 Posterior Odds 
 The previous results considered a variety of model specifications that generated different 
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impulse responses and fiscal multipliers.  Which of these specifications is favored by the data?  
Additionally, the results reported by LPT suggest transfers are important for debt stabilization.  
Does this strong preference for transfer financing persist in the presence of non-Ricardian 
behavior?  To answer these types of questions it is common to examine posterior model 
probabilities, which assess the degree of support for a particular specification (Koop, 2003).  
Generally comparisons are made between two competing models using the posterior odds ratio, 
which is simply the ratio of posterior model probabilities.  When each model is assigned an equal 
probability of occurring the posterior odds ratio boils down to Bayes factor, which is calculated 
as the ratio of marginal likelihoods.  I calculate the log-marginal likelihood and Bayes factor for  
various model specifications by applying Geweke’s (1999) modified harmonic mean estimator15 
to the posterior simulation draws.   
 Results are reported in table 8 for several specifications of labor supply and gamma.  For 
comparison, I also performed additional simulations for the fully rational model in which γ=0, 
and the unrestricted model in which the transfer response to debt has been turned off, i.e. γz=0.  
The data exhibit a strong preference for the unrestricted model in which the fraction of non-
Ricardians is estimated to be .70.  The unrestricted model in which gamma was fixed at .20 is 
                                                          
15
 Results are reported with a truncation parameter of .5.  The results varied little with changes in the parameter. 
 
Table 6. Model Fit Comparisons 
 
Model Specification Log-Marginal Likelihood
Bayes Factor relative to unrestricted 
labor supply, γ=.7
Unrestricted labor supply, γ=.7 -60 1.0
Unrestricted labor supply, γ=.2 -89 exp[29]
Restricted labor supply, γ=.2 -98 exp[38]
Unrestricted, , γ=.2, no transfers/debt response -97 exp[37]
Fully rational, γ=0 -91 exp[31]
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only slightly favored over the fully rational specification of LPT.  The data provide somewhat 
less support for both the restricted labor supply specification and the model in which the transfer-
debt response has been eliminated.  Taken together, the Bayes factors indicate support for 
household heterogeneity and unrestricted labor supply.  That transfers response to debt is also 
important, though as expected, the preference is less dramatic than reported by LPT. 
   
4.6 Present-value financing 
 I now repeat the present-value financing exercise performed by LPT for the unrestricted 
model where γ=.20.  I calculate present-value decompositions of debt to determine what 
combination of adjustments in the expected paths of fiscal policy instruments and discount rates 
rationalize the observed value of government debt, and how these adjustments vary with the type 
of shock.  In log-linearized form, the government’s present-value relation is  
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where the unscripted variables represent steady state values and  ̂   
 ,  ̂   
 , and  ̂   
  are real 
capital, labor, and consumption tax revenues respectively.  This expression decomposes 
fluctuations in real debt into expected changes in the components of net-of-interest surpluses, at 
constant discount rates, and expected changes in real discount rates. 
 The results presented in table 9.  The table shows the present-value components 
following an innovation to each exogenous process.  Each shock is calibrated to raise or lower 
debt by one unit of the final good.  When the components have the same sign as the change in 
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debt, the component is expected to stabilize debt; when the signs differ, the component pushes 
debt further from its steady state value.  For example, after a government spending shock, capital 
and labor tax revenues increase, thereby helping stabilize debt, while consumption tax revenues 
move in the opposite direction.  Overall, the present value of surpluses moves to support debt, 
but the discount rate does not.  The increase in government spending forces the interest rate 
higher, leading to higher interest payments.  Similar results hold for technology and preference 
shocks.  
 Generally speaking, the results are largely similar to those found by LPT. The fiscal 
dynamics vary significantly dependent upon which fiscal instrument is responsible for the initial 
change in debt.  For both capital and labor taxes, the discount rate and surpluses each move to 
stabilize debt, though the discount rate plays a larger role after a labor tax shock.  After a capital 
tax shock, labor and consumption tax revenues also increase, pushing debt further away from its 
steady state value.  Government spending and transfers also rise though, eventually stabilizing 
the path of debt.  After a consumption tax innovation, the present value of surpluses does most of 
the work stabilizing debt.  A transfers innovation is also resolved solely by changes in the 
present value of surpluses while the discount rate is expected increase and push debt higher. 
 
Table 7. Present-value financing using the posterior mean for the unrestricted model, gamma=.2.  Shocks 
normalized to raise or lower debt by one unit.  The first five rows sum to the Surplus value in the seventh row.  
R and Surplus sum to the change in debt. 
 
Variable Shock
εa εb εl εi εg εtk εtl εtc εz
G -7.84 7.19 11.90 2.21 -28.29 -1.78 -3.69 -1.81 1.98
T
k
10.00 4.07 -16.41 -4.57 10.16 5.14 -6.29 -2.35 3.56
T
l
16.25 -3.24 -25.74 -6.13 4.42 1.66 21.84 -3.88 1.25
T
c
2.38 -0.38 -3.93 -0.33 -0.50 0.02 -0.31 12.91 -0.01
Z -25.20 23.60 38.19 7.04 15.95 -6.00 -12.37 -6.05 -5.66
R 3.42 -30.24 -3.01 2.77 -0.75 -0.04 -0.19 0.18 -0.11
Surplus -4.42 31.24 4.01 -1.77 1.75 -0.96 -0.81 -1.18 1.11
∆B -1 +1 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 +1
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 When compared to the findings of LPT, the model tested here produces a few 
discrepancies worth mentioning.  The particular instruments that move to stabilize debt play 
different roles, with capital tax revenues generally bearing more of the debt stabilization burden.  
For example, after a government spending shock, capital and labor taxes adjust more and while 
transfers adjust less.  Similarly, capital taxes play a larger role in stabilizing a labor tax shock 
while government spending and transfers are expected to adjust less.   After a transfers 
innovation, both capital and labor taxes are expected to adjust more while government spending 
decreases less.  Additionally, instead of decreasing to stabilize debt, the discount rate resists 
stabilization slightly after a transfers shock. 
  Figure 11 reports the present-value funding horizons of government debt innovations for 
the various fiscal shocks.  The graph illustrates how long it takes for the present-value balance to 
be restored after the various fiscal policy shocks perturb government debt.  Specifically, the 
figure reports the truncated sum over horizon K, denoted by PVt (K), and defined by:  
 
          ∑ 
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where S is the steady state net-of-interest surplus and  ̂    denotes percentage deviations of the  
surplus from the steady state.  Time is measured on the x-axis in quarters.   
 The graph illustrates two main patterns.  In the quarters directly following the shock, the 
path of debt continues to diverge since the shocks are serially correlated.   After roughly eight 
quarters, the present-value balance is restored over a period of many years as the dynamics play 
out.  It is clear that the horizon varies by fiscal instrument.  Capital tax, consumption tax, and 
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transfers shocks are completely financed after 15 to 20 years.  In contrast, government spending 
and labor tax shocks take much longer to finance, in the range of 35 to 40 years.  When 
compared to the fully rational model, government spending shocks create a larger debt 
perturbation that takes longer to resolve.  The remaining funding horizons are similar.  
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
5.1 Fiscal policy parameter estimates for various specifications of    
  Since the baseline results for the unrestricted labor supply specification were generated 
when   was calibrated to .20, it is important to see how the remaining model parameters vary for 
different assumptions regarding the fraction of non-Ricardians.  Table 10 presents the posterior 
 
Figure 9. Government debt funding horizons for fiscal shocks.  The x-axis units are quarters. 
 


















modes for various specifications of   under the assumption of unrestricted labor supply.   The 
fourth column presents the posterior modes when gamma is estimated from the data.  The results 
are largely similar across all specifications, but a couple of differences stand out.  As the fraction 
increases, the Frisch elasticity and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution become smaller, 
reflecting the restrictions placed on the budget constraint of non-Ricardians.  The response of 
labor taxes to output       is the only fiscal policy parameter that is substantially altered, 
demonstrating an inverse relationship with the value of  . 
 
5.2 Subsample estimates 
In light of LPT’s findings that some parameter estimates are sensitive to the time period 
 
Table 8. Posterior modes for various calibrations of γ, variable  labor supply. 
 
Parameter
20% 35% 50% 70%
1
Risk aversion ω 2.13 2.18 3.99 3.41
Inverse Frisch elas. κ 1.60 1.99 5.31 4.09
Habit formation h 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.65
Capital util. costs δ2 0.44 0.42 0.38 0.45
Investment adj. costs s" 5.65 5.61 5.30 5.22
Fraction of non-Ricardians, γ - - - 0.70
Fiscal Policy
Govt. spending debt coeff. γg 0.142 0.146 0.135 0.124
Capital tax debt coeff. γtk 0.468 0.475 0.464 0.453
Labor tax debt coeff. γtl 0.089 0.093 0.110 0.102
Transfer debt coeff. γz 0.360 0.366 0.395 0.356
Capital tax Y coeff. ψtk 2.207 2.205 2.252 2.233
Labor tax Y coeff. ψtl 0.267 0.261 0.213 0.182
Govt. spending Y coeff. ψg 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.027
Transfer Y coeff. ψz 0.157 0.158 0.152 0.133
Cap./Labor co-term φkl 0.203 0.203 0.203 0.202
Cap./cons. co-term φkc 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
Labor/cons. co-term φlc -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.031




under investigation, it is important to consider parameter stability by analyzing various 
subsamples.  To this end I analyze five subsamples, each starting or ending with significant shifts 
in fiscal policy.  The first subsample examines the entire postwar period before the financial 
crisis and recession of 2008-2009, which runs from 1960Q1-2007Q4.  This sample is roughly 
equivalent to the baseline sample used by LPT.  The next subsample looks at data from 1976Q1-
2011Q4, thereby avoiding the recession of 1973-1975 and the tax reduction act of 1975 that 
offered stimulus in the form of a one-time tax rebate.  The third subsample runs from 1989Q1-
2011Q4 and avoids the first few years of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which changed both 
personal and corporate income taxes.  The fourth subsample, 1993Q1-1991Q1, starts after the 
recession of 1990-1991 and the implementation of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993.  The fifth and final subsample examines the short time series starting in 2002Q1 and 
running through 2011Q4, which begins after the passing of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation ACT of 2001.   
Tables 11 and 12 present the posterior modes for each subsample, along with the full 
sample posterior mean for ease of comparison.    In both labor supply scenarios, the structural 
parameters vary somewhat over time.  Both the risk aversion parameter and the inverse Frisch 
elasticity tend to get smaller over time, bringing the estimates closer to those of Cogan et al 
(2010) derived from the model of Smets and Wouters (2003) augmented with rule of thumb 
consumers.  Corroborating the findings of LPT and Smets and Wouters (2003), the habit 
formation parameter and the parameter relating depreciation to capacity utilization increase over 
time.  In the restricted specification the fraction of non-Ricardian consumers is fairly stable, 
ranging from 21-25% of the population over the various subsamples.  The fiscal policy 
parameters also exhibit some volatility over time, but appear to be more stable than reported by 
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LPT.  Government spending, capital taxes, and labor taxes tend to respond to debt more strongly 
over the course of the sample, while transfers seem to react to debt more strongly at the 
beginning and end of the sample.  As pointed out by LPT, the increase in the responses of capital 
and labor taxes to debt over time can be explained at least in part by policy changes that occurred 
in the middle of the sample.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 raised personal 
and corporate income taxes with the goal of reducing deficits, a policy change that implies an 
increase in both     and     in the post 1993 period. 
In the restricted model, the automatic stabilizer parameters are remarkably consistent  
across all subsamples.  This finding runs against the results of LPT and Cohen and Follette 
(2000) that suggest capital tax automatic stabilizer should increase over time while labor tax 
 















Risk aversion ω 2.32 2.50 2.06 1.88 1.77 1.70
Inverse Frisch elas. κ 2.43 2.67 2.00 2.08 1.90 1.74
Fraction of non-Ricardians γ 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22
Habit formation h 0.64 0.57 0.67 0.68 0.81 0.85
Capital util. costs δ2 0.44 0.35 0.55 0.64 0.61 0.58
Investment adj. costs s" 5.64 5.48 5.52 5.42 5.34 5.18
Govt. spending debt coeff. γg 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.26
Capital tax debt coeff. γtk 0.47 0.36 0.38 0.73 0.73 0.44
Labor tax debt coeff. γtl 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.21
Transfer debt coeff. γz 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.19 0.22 0.35
Capital tax Y coeff. ψtk 2.21 2.19 2.24 2.29 2.09 2.20
Labor tax Y coeff. ψtl 0.30 0.23 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.30
Govt. spending Y coeff. ψg 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
Transfer Y coeff. ψz 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20
Cap./Labor co-term φkl 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.12
Cap./cons. co-term φkc 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03
Labor/cons. co-term φlc -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
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automatic stabilizer should decrease.  The former results is owed to a decrease in the 
progressivity of labor tax rates over the sample period while the latter is suggested by increases 
in the elasticity of social insurance contributions with respect to its tax base.  In both cases the 
labor tax automatic stabilizer actually increases over time, and the capital tax stabilizer, while 
fairly stable, does increase slightly in the samples beginning in 1976 and 1989 before decreasing 
after 1993.  When the sample period is limited to pre-2008 data, the estimates from the 
unrestricted model more closely resemble those of LPT.  The elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution, the Frisch elasticity, and the habit formation parameter all smaller than the full 
sample mean.  The response of capital taxes is also smaller than the full sample mean, indicating 
 















Risk aversion ω 2.262 2.39 2.20 2.00 1.93 1.92
Inverse Frisch elas. κ 1.726 1.94 1.45 1.70 1.57 1.56
Habit formation h 0.590 0.54 0.61 0.63 0.74 0.81
Capital util. costs δ2 0.493 0.40 0.58 0.66 0.62 0.58
Investment adj. costs s" 5.651 5.50 5.53 5.42 5.33 5.17
Govt. spending debt coeff. γg 0.158 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.22 0.25
Capital tax debt coeff. γtk 0.481 0.37 0.39 0.74 0.74 0.45
Labor tax debt coeff. γtl 0.104 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.22
Transfer debt coeff. γz 0.364 0.34 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.34
Capital tax Y coeff. ψtk 2.217 2.17 2.22 2.29 2.08 2.18
Labor tax Y coeff. ψtl 0.311 0.24 0.24 0.34 0.35 0.30
Govt. spending Y coeff. ψg 0.060 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
Transfer Y coeff. ψz 0.197 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.19
Cap./Labor co-term φkl 0.202 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.12
Cap./cons. co-term φkc 0.029 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03
Labor/cons. co-term φlc -0.027 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
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that some of the novelty in the estimated fiscal policy parameters is driven by recent trends in the 
data.  Tables 13 and 14 display the long-run fiscal multipliers associated with the subsample 
estimates, calculated at the posterior modes of the various subsamples.  Reflecting the moderate 
instability in the model parameters across the subsamples, the present-value multipliers also 
change over time.  In the case of capital and labor tax shocks, the sign of the multiplier even 
differs across time periods.  A couple of patterns emerge.  Increases in government spending and 
labor taxes have become more costly over time in terms of forgone output.  On the other hand, 
capital tax shocks were responsible for less consumption and investment crowd out in the later 
sample periods, leading to a much smaller decrease in aggregate output in the long run. This 
 
Table 11. Long-run (k=∞) present-value multipliers.  Subsample estimates.  Evaluated at the 
posterior mode of each subsample. Unrestricted labor supply, γ=.20. 
 
1960Q1- 1960Q1- 1976Q1- 1989Q1- 1993Q1- 2002Q1-
Variable 2011Q4 2007Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4
∆Y -0.156 -0.163 -0.174 -0.382 -0.348 -0.134
∆C -0.732 -0.742 -0.724 -0.785 -0.764 -0.787
∆I -0.424 -0.421 -0.450 -0.597 -0.584 -0.347
∆Y -0.585 -0.594 -0.394 -0.202 -0.160 -0.096
∆C -0.232 -0.254 -0.187 -0.322 -0.171 0.024
∆I -0.666 -0.675 -0.588 -0.495 -0.559 -0.443
∆Y 0.036 0.013 -0.126 -0.173 -0.215 -0.345
∆C -0.136 -0.143 -0.232 -0.306 -0.265 -0.267
∆I -0.0003 -0.030 -0.126 -0.102 -0.170 -0.305
∆Y -0.512 -0.527 -0.474 -0.407 -0.456 -0.321
∆C 0.148 0.163 0.187 0.187 0.221 0.293
∆I -0.358 -0.345 -0.332 -0.312 -0.408 -0.282
Government spending present-value multipliers





finding is particularly important since the data suggest a stronger tendency to use capital taxes to 
retire debt in the more recent sample periods.  Meanwhile, an increase in transfers also tends to 
be less onerous to unwind in more recent times as consumption is boosted more and investment 
is crowded out less in the later subsamples. 
 
Table 12.  Long-run (k=∞) present-value multipliers.  Subsample estimates.  Evaluated at the 
posterior mode of each subsample. Restricted labor supply. 
 
1960Q1- 1960Q1- 1976Q1- 1989Q1- 1993Q1- 2002Q1-
Variable 2011Q4 2007Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4 2011Q4
∆Y -0.064 -0.116 -0.130 -0.400 -0.383 -0.108
∆C -0.670 -0.704 -0.703 -0.815 -0.814 -0.779
∆I -0.395 -0.412 -0.427 -0.585 -0.570 -0.330
∆Y -0.791 -0.790 -0.613 -0.357 -0.406 -0.356
∆C -0.495 -0.511 -0.420 -0.576 -0.570 -0.294
∆I -0.602 -0.611 -0.556 -0.374 -0.386 -0.365
∆Y -0.135 -0.260 -0.421 -0.332 -0.478 -0.826
∆C -0.355 -0.681 -0.892 -0.892 -0.929 -1.040
∆I 0.058 0.051 0.006 0.074 -0.002 -0.251
∆Y -0.704 -0.656 -0.670 -0.571 -0.685 -0.500
∆C -0.059 0.008 -0.063 -0.034 -0.080 -0.022
∆I -0.340 -0.321 -0.280 -0.247 -0.324 -0.125
Government spending present-value multipliers





CHAPTER 4: FEDERAL RESERVE FORECASTS AS FISCAL NEWS: RESULTS 
FROM AN IDENTIFIED VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION AND STRUCTURAL MODEL 
 
1. The VAR and Identification 
 The basic econometric framework is owed to Blanchard and Perotti (2002): 
 
               
 
where    consists of quarterly real per capita taxes, government spending, and GDP and      is 
the lag operator.  Blanchard and Perotti spend a great deal of time exploring the identification of 
the model, using institutional information about taxes, spending, and transfer programs to 
construct parameters that quantify the contemporaneous relationships between taxes, spending, 
and GDP.   After a thorough investigation, they find that government spending does not respond 
to GDP or taxes contemporaneously.  This means that government spending shocks can be 
identified using a standard Choleski decomposition with government spending ordered first.   
The same identification scheme is used by a number of authors, including a 2007 investigation 
by Perotti that uses a seven variable system.  This paper follows Ramey and Shaprio (1998) and 
Ramey (2011) by augmenting a similar VAR with the fiscal news variable ordered first, followed 
by government spending and a similar set of additional variables for purposes of comparison.    
In addition to the Federal Reserve forecasts, I will examine VAR’s that contain the log of real 
capita quantities of total government spending, GDP, total hours worked, nondurable plus 
services consumption
16
, private fixed investment, the Barro and Redlick (2010 ) tax rate, and the 
                                                          
16
 Chained non-durable and services consumption are aggregated using Whelan’s (2000) method. 
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log of nominal compensation in private business divided by the deflator in private business
17
.  I 
follow Ramey by using the total hours worked series based on unpublished BLS data, graciously 
provided on her website, based on the findings on Cavallo (2005) that suggest a significant 
portion of rises in government spending consists of increases in the government payroll.  Ramey 
and Shapiro (1998) show that the product wage, rather than the consumption wage, is better 
suited for comparing model predictions form both an empirical and theoretical perspective.   The 
rationale is based on the fact that defense spending tends to be concentrated in a few industries 
like manufactured goods.   Ramey and Shaprio show that the relative price of manufactured 
goods rises significantly during a defense buildup, possibly leading to a situation where the 
consumption wage is unchanged or rising while the product wage is falling.  For reasons to be 
discussed in section 3, I estimate two versions of the model.  In both cases four lags of the 
variables are included; where they differ is in the treatment of the time trend.  A complete 
account of data used is provided in appendix E. 
 
2. Post-war Government Spending 
 Government spending is commonly broken down into three components: federal defense, 
federal non-defense, and state and local.  What constitutes each type of spending?  Defense 
spending is mostly self-explanatory, but a 2012 Congressional Budget Office report breaking 
down federal discretionary spending for 2011 indicates nearly 18% of the defense budget went 
toward research, development, testing, evaluation, atomic energy, and several “other” categories.  
Federal non-defense spending was dominated by education, training, employment, and social 
services (18% of discretionary non-defense spending), transportation (14%), income security 
                                                          
17
 Ramey’s (2011) results are robust to using Alexander and Seater’s (2009) update of the Seater (1982) and 
Stephenson (1998) average marginal tax rate.  The Barro-Redlick (2010) tax rate includes state income taxes 
whereas the Alexander-Seater series only has federal income and social security taxes. 
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(11%), and health (10%)
18
 over the same period.  State and local governments spent most heavily 
on education, social services, transportation, and public safety
19
. 
 Figure 12 illustrates the time series properties of each of these components in real, per-
capita terms.  It is clear that federal non-defense spending is a small portion of total spending and 
exhibits minimal volatility.  The fluctuations in total spending then are primarily driven by a 
combination of defense and state and local spending.  Prior to 1975, fluctuations in total 
spending appear to be driven almost entirely by defense purchases as state and local spending 
followed a smooth upward trend.   Large military buildups during the Korean and Vietnam wars 
                                                          
18
 Other significant categories are veteran’s benefits and services, administration of justice, and international 
affairs 
19
 It is also worth noting that transfer payments are not included in measures of government spending.  Dramatic 
increases in transfer payments for programs like Medicare and Social Security have been a key driver of rising 
government outlays in recent times. 
 








1950q1 1960q1 1970q1 1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
Year
all spending defense
state and local non-defense
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are plainly evident in both the defense and total spending time series.  After 1975, however, both 
components drive movements in total spending.  The dramatic cuts in state and local spending 
that began in the early 1980’s is particularly evident in the aggregate spending time series, even 
as cold war defense spending was on the upswing.  After 1990, state and local spending resumed 
its steady upward march with some modest reductions evident during the Clinton administration.  
 At a lower frequency, the overall increase in real per-capita government spending is 
primarily a function of increasing state and local expenditures as defense spending exhibits no 
upward trend over time.  In fact, as a share of GDP, defense spending has decreased from its 
1952 third quarter peak of 15% to just over 5% in 2008.  Meanwhile, state and local spending 
has climbed from 6.7%  to 12.5% of GDP over the same time horizon.   
 Given these facts, what type of spending is best suited to identify the response of 
consumption to changes in government spending?  What econometric challenges do these time 
series present?  In response to the first question, most researchers have focused on defense 
spending since it is the component most likely to be exogenous with respect to most 
macroeconomic aggregates (see Hall (2009) for a nice survey of the government spending 
literature).  It has been postulated that defense buildups are likely the result of various political 
and diplomatic exigencies outside the realm of domestic economic activity.  Ramey (2011) 
points to two specific problems with non-defense spending in the context of this investigation.  
First, a large portion of non-defense spending is allocated to education.  Educational spending is 
driven in large part by demographic changes (which also have a large impact on the economy) 
and creates human capital.  Second, the efficient provision of public goods may actually have a 
positive wealth effect, blurring the distinction between New Keynesian and Classical model 
predictions.  In summary, not only is defense spending responsible for most of the post-war 
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variation in total government spending, it is also less likely to enter into the aggregate production  
function or interact with private consumption. 
 The two econometric issues that merit formal treatment are stationarity and cointegration.  
There is a clear upward trend in government spending and several other variables that will 
become part of the VAR analysis in subsequent sections.  However, is the trend in the data best 
described by a deterministic or a stochastic process?  Following the blueprint of Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), I perform Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
20
 on the time series of interest.  In 
addition, I perform an augmented Dickey-Fuller t-test in which the times series are transformed 
by a generalized least-squares regression.  The critical values are interpolated from the tables 
constructed by Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).   Table 15 presents the results.  When the  
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 Four lags of the first differences are included in the ADF tests.   
 









ln government spending -2.575 -0.152 -3.141 -2.809 -2.667 -2.707
ln GDP -2.575 -0.997 -3.141 -3.958* -2.667 -3.016**
ln consumption -2.575 -1.735 -3.141 -3.088 -2.667 -1.815
ln fixed investment -2.575 -1.554 -3.141 -3.319* -2.667 -2.32
ln total hours worked -2.575 -1.424 -3.141 -1.706 -2.667 -1.839
ln product wage -2.575 -0.363 -3.141 -1.955 -2.667 -2.032
Barro-Redlick tax rate -2.575 -2.698* -3.141 -2.021 -2.667 -0.65
Federal Reserve growth forecasts -2.575 -2.328 -3.141 -2.328 -2.667 -1.50
∆ government spending -2.576 -4.624*** -2.668 -2.827*
∆ ln GDP -2.576 -5.102*** -2.668 -3.254**
∆ ln consumption -2.576 -4.842*** -2.668 -4.688***
∆ ln fixed investment -2.576 -4.451*** -2.668 -3.687***
∆ ln total hours worked -2.576 -4.49*** -2.668 -4.259***
∆ ln product wage -2.576 -4.592*** -2.668 -2.993**
* indicates  s igni ficance at 10% level
** indicates  s igni ficance at the 5% level











 variables are in levels, with the exception of the Barro-Redlick average marginal tax rate, the 
null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level.  The Federal Reserve forecasts 
fall just short of the critical value.  When a deterministic time rend component is added to the 
test, only GDP and fixed investment appear stationary.  In almost all cases though, the ADF tests 
do not offer overwhelming evidence in either direction.   
 Figure 13 presents the linearly detrended time series for durables and services 
consumption, fixed investment, GDP, and government spending for the period 1965q1 to 2005q2 
for which the Federal Reserve forecast data is available.  Visual inspection reveals no distinct 
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trends and gives the appearance of stationarity, albeit with some persistence in quarterly 
fluctuations.  In light of this finding, I will follow the two-pronged approach of Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) by estimating two forms of the VAR.  The first will follow the specification used 
by Ramey (2011) and include all variables in levels allowing for a deterministic, quadratic time 
trend
21
.  The second form will allow for a stochastic trend.  I take the first differences of each 
variable and account for the underlying drift by subtracting a changing mean, constructed as the 
arithmetic average of the past first differences with a decay parameter of 5% per quarter.   
 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) performed a battery of cointegration tests, including the 
relationship between taxes and the components of spending.  Formal tests revealed no strong 
evidence for a cointegrating relationship between taxes and spending, rejecting the null of a unit 
root at about the 5 percent level but no lower.   This finding is corroborated by several empirical 
studies, including Bohn (1998).  Without clear direction from the data, Blanchard and Perotti 
decide to compare their benchmark results to the case where taxes and spending are cointegrated, 
reporting that the results are little changed.  Given these findings, I leave the exploration of 
cointegrating relationships to future work. 
 
3. Federal Reserve Forecasts 
 The Federal Reserve makes Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting materials 
available to the public with a five year lag.  The Fed’s website contains meeting minutes and 
policy documents dating back to 1936.  Beginning with the June 17 meeting in 1964, the Fed 
also began archiving the “Green Book” in pdf format, a report prepared by the staff of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  The Green Book summarizes current economic 
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and financial conditions for meeting participants, and is still published to this day.  Starting with 
the FOMC meeting in the second quarter of 1965, the Green Book contains quarterly forecasts of 
various macro aggregates in nominal terms, including government spending and its components.  
Over time, the forecast became more extensive and eventually the staff began projecting figures 
out several quarters into the future in terms of real growth rates.  In the cases where only nominal 
forecasts are made, I convert the values into real terms using the forecasted value of the GDP 
deflator.  From the archived Green Books I was able to construct a consistent, one quarter-ahead 
forecast for defense spending from 1965:2 to 2005:2.   A four quarter-ahead forecast is available 
beginning in 1974:2.  To my knowledge, this is the longest available time series for quarterly 
forecasts of defense spending.  This allows me to incorporate the forecasts themselves in the 
VAR rather than using forecast errors
22
 , which has a material effect on the impulse responses.  
One notable omission from this sample period is the Korean War buildup, the largest instances of 
post-WWII military spending.  At first blush this would seem problematic; however, some 
authors have argued though that this period should be omitted from the analysis anyway since it 
is an outlier in the post 1947 time period.   
 The Fed forecasts will be used in a VAR framework as a new measure of “fiscal news” to 
explore the timing of government spending shocks and test the Ramey hypothesis.  Are the Fed 
forecasts an appropriate instrument for such an investigation?  Figure 14 plots the one quarter-
ahead forecasts of defense spending growth along with actual defense spending growth for the 
sample period.  The forecasts predict spending growth between periods t and t+1 using 
information available in period t.  The series of forecasts is lagged one period so the predicted 
                                                          
22
 Ramey used Survey of Professional Forecasters forecast errors as a measure of fiscal news.   The forecast error is 
calculated as the difference between predicted spending growth in period t using t-1 information and actual 
spending growth in period t.  Ramey uses the forecast errors rather than the forecasts themselves in order to be 
able to combine samples that use defense spending forecasts and federal spending forecasts. 
77 
 
value lines up with the actual measured value.  While far from perfect, there several instances 
where the forecasts accurately predict changes in defense spending such as the early to mid-
1990’s and early 2000’s.  The forecasts are particularly poor in the early 1980’s, which is 
perhaps explained by heightened uncertainty regarding domestic and foreign policy stemming 
from the Volcker disinflation and Cold War diplomacy.  It is also clear that the volatility of the 
forecasts is much higher after the mid 1990’s, exhibiting a tendency to overshoot the measured 
value substantially.  Formal statistical tests indicate that the forecasts are a valid instrument, 
though not as powerful as the Survey of Professional Forecasters presented by Ramey.  Table 16 
presents several regression-based tests for both the full sample period and a subsample starting in 
1985 where there appears to be a shift in volatility.  R-squared values and F-statistics are 
reported when federal or defense spending in periods t or t+1 are regressed on the one or two 
 









1970q1 1980q1 1990q1 2000q1 2010q1
Year
Forecasted Defense Spending Actual Defense Spending
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step-ahead forecasts made in period t-1.  Marginal F-statistics on the exclusion of the forecast 
variables in a regression that includes four lags of the following additional variables: log real per 
capita federal or defense spending, log real GDP, the 3-month T-bill rate, and the Barro-Redlick 
average marginal tax rate.  As Staiger and Stock (1997) discuss, a first-stage F-statistic under 10 
could be an indicator of a weak instrument problem.   As Ramey points out, most macro shocks 
used in the literature, including monetary and oil price shocks have F-statistics well below 10, 
but that is not the case here.  As expected, the one period-ahead forecasts have more predictive 
value than their two period-ahead counterparts with F-statistics either near or exceeding 20.  R-
squared values are on the low side however, with one period ahead forecasts explaining 11-16 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable.  These results are larger than the R-squared 
values of Ramey’s defense news variable computed using post-1955 data, but significantly lower 
than the survey of professional forecasters data which yielded an R-squared of .60 and F-
statistics exceeding 200.  While the two period-ahead forecasts are less informative, defense 
spending forecasts made two periods in advance still yield an F-statistic over 10 and an R-
squared of .127.  Generally speaking, the post-1985 subsample yields higher R-squared values in 
spite of greater volatility, consistent with improved forecasting methods over time.   
 
Table 14. Explanatory power of Fed forecasts. 
 
Forecast R-squared F-Statistic
Marginal     
F-Statistic
R-squared F-Statistic
Marginal      
F-Statistic
1 Period-ahead, All federal spending 0.114 20.18 14.7 0.1783 17.58 14.15
2 period-ahead, All federal spending 0.06 9.28 7.87 0.0318 2.7 1.27
1 period-ahead defense spending 0.16 29.9 16.68 20.66 21.09 18.04
2 period-ahead, defense spending 0.114 18.15 12.11 0.1272 11.95 7.62
* for 1 period ahead forecasts  ful l  sample period is  1965 Q3 - 2005 Q2.  For 2 period-ahead forecasts  the ful l  sample period




 While the forecasts appear to be useful instruments, this investigation is most concerned 
with the timing of information flows.  Specifically, are unexplained innovations in the VAR 
framework actually predicted by the Federal Reserve forecasters?  I answer this question by once 
again following the procedure used by Ramey.  I first compute the series of VAR shocks by 
estimating the baseline VAR specification given in section 2 and collecting the residuals.  I then 
perform Granger causality tests to explore the timing with the p-values reported in table 3.  The 
results are clear: both federal and defense spending forecasts Granger cause the VAR shocks but 
the opposite is not true.  In other words, I find corroborating evidence for the Ramey’s premise: 
variations that appear to be random shocks from the econometrician’s perspective are able to be 
forecasted. 
 
4. Vector Autoregression Results  
4.1 Baseline VAR  
 In order to provide a basis for comparison, figure 15 illustrates the dynamic response of 
several macro variables to a government spending shock, identified using the standard Choleski 
decomposition with government spending ordered first.  The VAR, consisting of government 
spending, GDP, total hours worked, nondurable plus services consumption, private fixed 
investment, the Barro-Redlick (2010) tax rate, and the manufacturing product wage, is typical of 
the government spending studies in the literature.  All variables are in levels and each equation  
 
Table 15: Granger causality tests 
 
Hypothesis tests p-value
Do 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of federal spending Granger-cause VAR shocks? Yes 0.0475
Do 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending Granger-cause VAR shocks? Yes 0.049
Do VAR shocks Granger-cause 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of federal spending? No 0.657
Do VAR shocks Granger-cause 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending? No 0.213
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contains a quadratic time trend.  The figure traces the mean response and the 95% confidence 
bands
23
 for a period of twenty quarters.  Throughout this section shocks are normalized so that 
the log change of government spending after a shock to the news variable is unity at its peak.   
 Qualitatively, the responses are typical for the literature.  The positive government 
spending shock causes GDP to rise initially and stay positive for several quarters.  The mean 
response of consumption of nondurables and services is also positive for roughly twelve quarters  
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 It is common to report 68% confidence bands in the fiscal policy literature, though there is no theoretical 
justification for this choice.  Instead, I show the 95% bands common in the monetary policy literature.   
 
Figure 13. Baseline VAR 
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before turning negative.  Total hours and the real wage also tend to rise while investment falls as 
government spending crowds out some private activity.  Fiscal multipliers are summarized in 
table 18. 
 
4.2  The Fiscal News VAR 
 One of the primary questions this paper seeks to answer is how these responses change 
when anticipation effects are accounted for.  To answer this question I now examine several 
model specifications involving Federal Reserve forecasts as a measure of fiscal news.  I follow 
Ramey by using the approach of Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), which utilizes a set 
of fixed variables while rotating in other variables of interest one at a time.  While this method 
requires re-estimating the VAR multiple times, it allows me to examine the effect on several 
variables while maintaining a relatively parsimonious specification.  The fixed set of variables 
includes the Federal Reserve forecasts, the log of real per capita government spending and the 
log of real per-capita GDP.  To control for monetary and tax policy, the three-month T-bill rate 
and the Barro-Redlick average marginal income tax rate are also included in the fixed set.  The 
extra variables considered are total hours, the manufacturing product wage, the real BAA bond 
rate (with inflation defined by the CPI), along with the components of consumption and 
investment  spending.    This exercise  is  completed  twice, once utilizing a deterministic time  
 
Table 16. Standard dynamic response to a government spending shock. 
 
1 qrt 4 qtrs 8 qtrs 12 qtrs 20 qtrs peak cumulative irf
GDP 0.126 0.080 0.052 -0.008 -0.037 0.126 0.567
consumption* 0.013 0.017 0.020 -0.003 -0.024 0.025 0.010
fixed investment -0.249 -0.346 -0.192 -0.177 -0.114 -0.346 -4.255




trend (DT) and second time a stochastic trend (ST) as described above.  Finally, I examine the 
effect of using forecast errors rather the forecasts themselves as a measure of fiscal news.   A 




Figure 14. Impulse to expected defense spending 
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 4.3  Deterministic Trend Results 
 Figures 16 and 17 illustrate the response to a shock to the news variable assuming a 
deterministic trend.  As before, the responses are normalized so that the response of government 
spending peaks at unity.  The response of government spending peaks later and is significantly 
more persistent than the baseline, remaining positive for more than five years.  GDP rises upon 
impact, peaking after five quarters at a value of .5 before turning negative after eleven quarters.  
The stimulus is more than twice as large as the baseline estimate and significantly larger than  
 
Figure 15. Impulse to expected defense spending. 
 



































 that reported by Ramey who found the news shock to be contractionary when using the SPF 
forecasts as a measure of fiscal news
24
.  The cumulative impulse response after five years is 2.46.  
Interestingly, the response of consumption is largely positive, in stark contrast to the Ramey 
hypothesis.  The response of non-durables and services consumption is positive and persistent, 
peaking after five quarters at .30.  Durables consumption also rises upon impact before turning 
negative after four quarters.  Hours and the real wage increase in a qualitatively similar fashion 
to the baseline estimate, while investment first rises before falling and remaining negative for 
several quarters.  Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the much of the existing identified 
VAR literature that predicts a rise in GDP, hours, the real wage, and consumption after a 
government spending shock. 
 
4.4  Stochastic Trend Results 
 Figures 18 and 19 depict the impulse responses when the deterministic trend is replaced 
with a stochastic trend.  With the exception of the manufacturing wage, the effects are 
qualitatively similar.  GDP, hours, and consumption all tend to rise after the shock while the  
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 Ramey reported a peak GDP response of .23 when using a narrative approach. 
 
Table 17. Dynamic response to a fiscal news shock, using actual forecasts for period t+1. 
 
1 qrt 4 qtrs 8 qtrs 12 qtrs 20 qtrs peak cumulative irf
GDP 0.313 0.496 0.079 -0.064 0.043 0.496 2.459
consumption* 0.157 0.303 0.221 0.093 0.008 0.303 2.790
fixed investment 0.782 0.367 -0.518 -0.896 -0.544 -0.910 -7.209
GDP 1.049 -0.071 -0.049 0.016 0.008 1.055 2.068
consumption* 0.256 0.142 0.032 0.045 0.031 0.256 1.346
fixed investment 3.392 0.043 -0.392 -0.247 -0.118 3.392 3.326





 wage is depressed initially before increasing.  GDP peaks soon after the shock at 1.05 and 
quickly returns to zero.  The cumulative response is slightly smaller than the deterministic trend 
at 2.07.  The response of consumption to a change in expected defense spending is again 
positive, with all components rising for roughly five quarters after impact.  The real wage in 
contrast displays a net negative response after the first year with a slight rise thereafter.  All 
components of investment display the same pattern of rising before falling, although the 
cumulative effect is less negative in the long run. 
 
Figure 16. Response to fiscal news shock, stochastic trend. 
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4.5  Forecast Error Results 
 I now turn to the question how the forecast data should be incorporated in the VAR.   In 
particular, does the use of forecast errors in place of the raw forecasts change the results?  To 
answer this question I incorporate the Federal Reserve forecast error defined as the difference 
between forecasted defense spending growth from period t-1 to t made with period t-1 
information, and actual growth from period t-1 to t.  The impulse responses following a shock to 
the forecast errors, shown in figures 20 and 21, tell a dramatically different story.  A fiscal news 
shock is now highly contractionary with output peaking at -.17 and remaining below zero for  
 
Figure 17.  Response to fiscal news shock using actual forecasts, stochastic trend. 
 



































 several years after impact.   Nondurables and services consumption also decrease after the 
shock, peaking at -.26 and -.38 respectively.  Only durables consumption shows any tendency to 
increase after the shock, though this component still decreases upon impact before recovering for  
 
Figure 18. Impulse to expected defense spending using forecast error. 
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several quarters and then eventually decreasing again.  The path of the real wage has also 
changed, now showing a substantial drop in response to the shock.  Residential investment 
declines for four years while nonresidential declines for five quarters before eventually rising.   
Complete multiplier results are presented in tables 19 and 20. 
 
5. DSGE Model Simulation Results 
 What if the Granger causality results reported above are the result of misspecification of 
the time series representation of the data or the omission of important variables from the VAR?   
 
Figure 19. Impulse to expected defense spending using forecast error. 
 



































Another approach to testing the validity of the Fed forecasts as measure of fiscal news is to 
analyze a structural model of the economy.  In theory, the structural model does not suffer from 
the same frailties as a reduced-form statistical model and is therefore an appealing source of 
corroborating evidence.    Specifically, I investigate whether or not the Federal Reserve forecasts 
Granger cause the DSGE model residuals for the consumption and hours worked variables?  If 
so, then this lends further credence to the hypothesis that changes in government spending are 
anticipated by agents and should therefore be modeled formally in a structural setting.  If not, 
then this would cast doubt on the ability of the identified VAR to fully capture the 
macroeconomic dynamics of anticipated fiscal policy.   
 
5.1 Model overview 
 This section provides a brief overview of the structural model employed here.  The model 
is the best-fitting specification presented in chapter three of this work, closely following the 
neoclassical growth model presented in Leeper, Plant and Traum (2010).  The primary 
distinctive feature is the presence of consumer heterogeneity in the form of two types of 
representative household.  The first household type displays optimizing behavior by maximizing 
 
Table 18. Dynamic response to a fiscal news shock, using forecast errors. 
 
1 qrt 4 qtrs 8 qtrs 12 qtrs 20 qtrs peak cumulative irf
GDP 0.005 -0.073 -0.064 -0.059 -0.098 -0.172 -1.470
consumption* -0.283 -0.399 -0.253 -0.078 -0.010 -0.399 -3.347
fixed investment -0.535 0.330 0.612 0.188 -0.635 0.612 0.327
GDP 0.008 0.038 0.040 0.003 0.000 0.121 0.100
consumption* -0.011 0.028 0.022 -0.003 0.000 -0.034 0.086
fixed investment -0.410 -0.602 -0.080 -0.034 0.010 -0.602 -1.056





an intertemporal utility function, referred to as a Ricardian agent.  The second type of 
representative agent exhibits rule-of-thumb, or non-Ricardian behavior.    The model also 
contains a representative firm and the government, featuring a rich specification of fiscal policy 
rules.  The model economy is buffeted by nine temporary innovations: shocks to government 
spending, capital, labor, and consumption taxes, transfer payments, technology, investment 
adjustment costs, and preferences.  For further details, please see appendix A.  
 
5.2. Ricardian Households  
 A fraction of the population   [   ] is non-Ricardian.  The remaining       of 
households is Ricardian and maximizes expected utility.  Preferences, common to all 


























t luhCcuE  
 
 
for   {    }.  Utility is derived from consumption, Jtc , relative to a habit stock defined as a 
fraction    [   ] of the previous period’s aggregate consumption, 1tC .  Hours worked, 
J
tl , 
yield disutility.  The utility function contains two preference shocks, one general (
b
tu ) and one 
specific to labor supply (
l
tu ).  The parameters       represent the coefficient of risk aversion 
and the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity respectively, and   [   ] is the discount 
factor. The shocks btu and 
l
tu  evolve according to the AR(1). 
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Ricardians have at their disposal after-tax labor and capital income, interest on government 
bonds held the previous period, and lump-sum transfer payments from the government, rtz .  
Income is consumed, invested in physical capital, or used to purchase government debt.  Capital 
income is computed as the rental rate of capital, ktR , multiplied by the effective quantity of 
capital employed by Ricardian households in period t, rttKv 1 .  The variable tv  is a household 
control variable that measures the utilization rate of the capital stock.  1tR  
is the return on one-
year government debt owned by Ricardian households, rtb .  The tax rates on consumption, labor 
income, and capital income are given by ct ,
l
t , and 
k
t respectively.  It should be emphasized 
that only Ricardian households save and invest in physical capital and consider an intertemporal 
resource allocation decision.   
 
5.3. Non-Ricardian Households 
 A fraction   [   ] of households lack access to financial and capital markets and must 
consume all current disposable income.  Income is derived from working (taxed at rate   
 ) and 
lump-sum transfers from the government, nrtz .  Consumption expenditures are subject to 
taxation at rate   
    The non-Ricardian budget constraint is therefore given as: 














I allow for different levels of consumption and labor supply for Ricardians and non-Ricardians.  
The formulation is similar that of Galí et al. (2007), where non-Ricardians cannot optimize 
intertemporally, but can still adjust hours to solve a static optimization problem taking their 
budget constraint as given.  Temporarily ignoring taxes, the problem becomes: 
 
                 
 
                    
 
The intratemporal Euler equation for non-Ricardians then takes the form: 
 





In equilibrium, the optimality condition for non-Ricardians is identical to that of Ricardians except for the 
levels of consumption and labor supply.  Thus, the only way labor supply will be equalized across 
households is if the equilibrium level of consumption is also the same for both Ricardians and non-
Ricardians.  
 
5.4. Government Sector 
 As the focus of this paper is fiscal policy, several salient features of the model are found 
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where tG  and tZ are government spending and transfer payments respectively.  In addition to 
issuing debt, the government sources funds by levying capital, labor, and consumption taxes.  
Funds are used to service debt, purchase final goods and services, and redistribute wealth via 
lump-sum transfer payments.   
Fiscal instruments behave according to a rich specification that allows for a response to 
the state of the economy.  The fiscal rules capture two important policy considerations: business 
cycle stabilization and debt stabilization.  First, contemporaneous co-movement with output 
allows fiscal instruments to behave as automatic stabilizers, acting to bring the economy closer 
to potential GDP.  Second, fiscal instruments are allowed to respond to the level of the federal 
debt.  Higher government debt in period t will trigger fiscal responses in period t+1 that tend to 
bring debt back to its steady state level.  Linearized, in terms of log-deviations from the steady 
state, the policy rules are: 
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where            {      } captures the fiscal response to deviations in output from 
potential GDP and            {        } models the response to government debt.  The 
consumption tax rate, largely capturing movement in excise taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and the 
like, is assumed to be an exogenous process.  Since excise taxes are used mainly for special 
funds, it is reasonable to believe they do not respond to changes in economic conditions.   
Additionally, each fiscal instrument is subject to persistent, random shocks, represented 
in the model by the sut ' .  The coefficients on the lagged shocks (   [   ]       
{            }) measure the degree of persistence of an exogenous change in policy.  
Furthermore, exogenous changes in one tax instrument are allowed to affect the remaining tax 
instruments.  This response is quantified by the parameter          {        }. 
Aggregate quantities of household variables are weighted averages of Ricardian and non-
Ricardian components: 












A complete characterization of the system of equations and steady state used to solve the model 
can be found in appendix A. 
 
5.5.Methodology and Results 
 The parameters of the structural model are estimated using Bayesian techniques.  Prior 
distributions are similar to those widely used in the literature.  I use quarterly data for nine time 
series: consumption, investment, hours worked, government debt, government spending, capital 
tax revenues, labor tax revenues, consumption tax revenues, and government transfers.  The data 
are converted to real terms by dividing by the GDP deflator for personal consumption 
expenditures.  To make the data stationary, I linearly detrend the natural logarithm of each time 
series independently.  After estimating the parameters of the model, the one period-ahead DSGE 
model forecast errors are computed using the Kalman filter and the time series data.  I then test 
the forecast errors generated by the DSGE model for Granger causality with the Federal Reserve 
forecasts.  Answering the question, do the Federal Reserve forecasts of government spending 
Granger cause the DSGE model residuals for consumption and hours worked?  
 I employ two approaches to compute the DSGE forecast errors.  In the first, I use the 
entire data set available to produce a single estimate for the structural parameters, calculated as 
the mean of the posterior distribution.  The posterior distribution is simulated using a random 
walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.  However, this approach may bias model predictions by 
incorporating into the model parameters ex post information about future fiscal policies that was 
not available to forecasters in real time.  To mitigate this concern, I create a series of one step-
ahead DSGE forecasts by re-estimating the parameter vector each quarter using only the data 
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available up until that time period.  The downside of this approach is that it is very costly from a 
computational standpoint.  To ease this burden, I use the posterior mode as the estimate of the 
parameter vector rather than simulating the posterior each quarter and calculating the mean.  This 
is similar to the “plug-in” approach described by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2012).  
 Complete Granger causality tests were performed using one period-ahead Federal 
Reserve forecasts of defense spending and Ramey’s time series of one period-ahead government 
spending forecast errors computed from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.   I test for 
causality in both directions between the measures of fiscal news and the DSGE model residuals 
for consumption and hours worked.  I perform this battery of tests for both parameter estimation 
methods described above.  In all cases four lags of each dependent variable are incorporated into 
the regressions.  Full results are presented in table 21.  The results are consistent across the 
numerous tests, regardless of which variable is used as a measure of fiscal news.  There is no 
statistical evidence that forecasted changes in government spending improve the DSGE model 




 The results presented in section 5 lead to diametrically opposed conclusions depending 
on which measure of fiscal news is utilized.  When the raw forecasts are used to identify changes 
in the present discounted value of defense spending, the VAR results corroborate much of the 
existing literature that finds GDP, consumption, hours, and the real wage to rise after a 
government spending shock, even when the changing in spending is anticipated.   However, if 
forecast errors are used as the measure of fiscal news then the classical model’s predictions 
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mostly ring true: an anticipated government spending shock leads to a reduction in the present 
value of future income streams, reducing consumption and increasing work effort.  This leads to 
higher output in the short run (a very small increase initially in this study) and a lower marginal 
product of labor that depresses wages.  In the former scenario fiscal stimulus may make some 
sense as a short-run policy option, while in the latter there is much less incentive to use it as a 
countercyclical maneuver.   
 Which measure of news is more appropriate?  If testing the merit of the classical model 
versus the New Keynesian model is the ultimate goal, then the best measure of news is that 
which immediately captures changes in the present discounted value of future income and tax 
streams.  Since the forecast error incorporates news that arrived last period (the forecast is made 
in period t-1), the raw forecasts made in period t would appear to be a superior measure.  Since 
news arrived last period it is not clear that the timing of agents’ decision making is accurately 
captured when forecast errors are used.  Additionally, there may be an econometric case for 
preferring the raw forecasts over the errors.  Since defense and total government spending are 
highly correlated, it is possible the forecast error, by incorporating the difference between actual 
 
Table 19. Granger Causality Tests 
 
Hypothesis tests: Single Parameter Estimates p-value
Do 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending Granger-cause DSGE Consumption forecast errors? No 0.5871
Do 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending Granger-cause DSGE Labor Supply forecast errors? No 0.9057
Do 1 period-ahead SPF forecasts Granger-cause DSGE Consumption forecast errors? No 0.4108
Do DSGE Consumption forecast errors Granger-cause 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending? No 0.9200
Do DSGE Labor Supply forecast errors Granger-cause 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending? No 0.2245
Do DSGE Labor Supply forecast errors Granger-cause 1 period-ahead SPF forecasts? No 0.6957
Hypothesis tests: Rolling Parameter estimates p-value
Do 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending Granger-cause DSGE forecast errors? No 0.5890
Do 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending Granger-cause DSGE Labor Supply forecast errors? No 0.3220
Do 1 period-ahead SPF forecasts Granger-cause DSGE Consumption forecast errors? No 0.7562
Do DSGE Consumption forecast errors Granger-cause 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending? No 0.9090
Do DSGE Labor Supply forecast errors Granger-cause 1 period-ahead Fed forecasts of defense spending? No 0.9676
Do DSGE Labor Supply forecast errors Granger-cause 1 period-ahead SPF forecasts? No 0.5373
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and forecasted defense spending, biases the regression results.  In any case, the disparate results 
indicate great care must be taken when incorporating forecast data in a fiscal policy VAR.  
 The structural model results suggest that perhaps more fundamental questions should be 
asked.  Why do the data fail to speak with a single voice?  Is anticipated government spending an 
important driver of household behavior?  A separate but related question is whether or not 
professional forecasts are a useful proxy for fiscal news.  If anticipated fiscal policy were an 
important part of the data generating process and effective proxies for fiscal news are utilized, 
then one would expect to find a systematic relationship between the structural model forecast 
errors and the fiscal news variable.  Using a DSGE model designed to capture the complex 
interactions between the various fiscal instruments used by the government and households, I 
find little evidence that measures of fiscal news improve the structural model’s forecasts.  One 
can conclude that either anticipated fiscal policy is not a visible component of household 
behavior, or the particular measures of fiscal news used here are not adequately capturing the 
anticipation effects.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 Fiscal policy is among the most pertinent topics in contemporary macroeconomics.  
Countercyclical fiscal policy, intended to mitigate the harmful effects of recessions on output and 
employment, has been used extensively in recent times. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act was designed to pump nearly $800 billion of fiscal stimulus into the economy 
to combat the Great Recession.  Long-run fiscal planning is also at the forefront of current public 
policy.  In both the US and Europe governments are grappling with the proper mix of sensible 
spending, debt reduction, and taxation while simultaneously fostering an environment that 
enhances the prospects for long-run growth.  Given the complexities of the macro economy and 
the realities of the modern political system that drives fiscal policy, understanding the 
ramifications of accruing debt and the fiscal adjustments required to keep the economy on a 
sustainable fiscal path is a daunting yet crucial task.   
 This paper has added to the growing body of literature by conducting theoretical and 
empirical investigations into the inner workings of fiscal policy.  In chapter three, I explore how 
a particular departure from full rationality, justified by a plethora of microeconomic evidence, 
affects fiscal adjustments under two different labor supply assumptions.  Leeper, Plante, and 
Traum (2010) found that the US time series data prefer rich fiscal policy rules and that debt 
financed fiscal adjustments have long lasting effects that can stand in stark contrast to those of 
conventional models.  I build upon their work by exploring household heterogeneity, inspired by 
the savers and spenders theory of fiscal policy of Mankiw (2000).  The contributions are two-
fold.  First, by allowing transfer payments to affect disposable income and therefore the 
consumption bundless of non-Ricardian households, the time series data are viewed through a 
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more flexible lens.  This modification directly affects the estimation of model parameters.  
Transfers respond more weakly to debt while capital and labor taxes become more important.  
Capital taxes and transfers also have stronger roles as automatic stabilizers of output.  Second, 
household heterogeneity changes the way in which fiscal adjustments are perceived and reacted 
to by consumers, thereby changing the economic impact of these adjustments.  These effects are 
studied for two labor supply specifications.  In aggregate, households are less able to respond to 
expected future policy adjustments by modifying their behavior immediately.  Both of these 
implications have tangible effects on the impulse responses and present-value multipliers 
generated by the model, particularly in the short run.   The restricted model allows for transfers 
to create some modest short-run stimulus and implies less short-run crowding out of 
consumption in the face of an increase in government spending.  Provided the fraction of non-
Ricardian consumers is in the neighborhood of the 50% suggested by Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989), it is even possible for a real model to exhibit crowding in of consumption after a 
government spending shock, which would bring the theoretical predictions more in line with the 
bulk of empirical evidence.  When non-Ricardians optimize intratemporally however, the 
consumption multiplier after a spending shock is definitively negative, while spending and 
transfers multipliers yield less short-run stimulus as agents demand more leisure when disposable 
income increases.  As the fraction of non-Ricardian households increases to the .70 in the 
specification most favored by the data, the discrepancy between the two labor supply 
specifications widens.  In particular, capital taxes and transfers become very costly in the long 
run in terms of forgone output.   
 Measures of model fit provide additional insight.  The data favor an economy populated 
by both spenders and savers, and intratemporal optimization is preferred to an economy where 
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hours worked are artificially equalized across household types.  Models where transfers respond 
to debt are still preferred, though less dramatically than reported previously. 
 Regardless of household composition, it remains clear that long-run effects are markedly 
different from short-run effects.  The larger short-run stimulus created by the presence of non-
Ricardian households is ephemeral.  Eventually, debt financed fiscal adjustments require costly 
future adjustments to retire the debt.  When debt is retired using distortionary taxes, the 
cumulative effect of these adjustments is small, and in most cases, negative. 
 In chapter four I seek to understand how government spending affects macroeconomic 
aggregates when policy changes are anticipated.  This question is important since many policy 
actions are debated in congress and discussed in popular news outlets before being enacted.  If 
agents are rational, they will incorporate news about future spending changes before they are 
enacted.  Specifically, for a rational, forward-looking agent in the classical model a change in the 
present discounted value of lifetime income will induce a negative wealth effect.  This decrease 
in wealth causes agents to devote more time to work and reduce consumption.  However, much 
of the current empirical literature finds just the opposite to be true: a rise in government spending 
causes output, hours, consumption, and the real wage to increase.   This finding is typically 
thought to lend credence to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with sticky prices 
and various degrees of market imperfections, of the type exemplified by Smets and Wouters 
(2007).   However, Ramey and other proponents of the narrative approach to identifying 
government spending shocks provide evidence that the increase in consumption following an 
increase in defense spending is rather a reflection of the fiscal shocks being anticipated, and 
therefore mistimed by the econometrician. 
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 When Federal Reserve forecasts are used to identify government spending shocks I find 
that consumption, hours, wages, and output all increase following the shock.  The output 
multiplier measured as the peak response is around .5 using a deterministic trend and around 
unity using a stochastic trend.  The responses are qualitatively similar to those found by authors 
using the standard Choleski decomposition to identify government spending shocks.  One the 
other hand, if forecast errors are used in place of the forecasts themselves, the results are quite 
similar to those found by authors using the narrative approach of Shapiro and Ramey (1998) and 
Ramey (2011).  Hours increase following a shock while consumption and wages decrease.  Over 
the five year response period the shock causes output to contract.   It stands to reason that the raw 
forecasts are a better measure of changes in the present discounted value of disposable income.  
If this is the case, then the results of this paper would tend to support sticky price models of the 
macro economy over the classical paradigm.   
 In the second part of chapter four, I use the best-fitting structural model developed in 
chapter three to see if the Federal Reserve forecasts are able to improve the forecasts of the 
structural model. If not, then it is possible that the reduced form statistical model is suffering 
from misspecification and that the granger causality between the standard VAR residuals and the 
Federal Reserve forecasts found to be present in the sample is misleading.  The structural model 
is designed to capture the complex interactions between households and the various fiscal 
instruments used by the government, perhaps addressing interactions missing in the VAR.  In 
fact, I find little evidence that measures of fiscal news would improve the structural model’s fit 
to the time series data.  The results suggest that perhaps some fundamental questions need to be 
addressed.  Why do the data fail to speak with a single voice when forecasts are incorporated into 
the VAR in slightly different ways?  Is anticipated government spending an important driver of 
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household behavior?  A separate but related question is whether or not professional forecasts are 
a useful proxy for fiscal news.  If anticipated fiscal policy is an important part of the data 
generating process and effective proxies for fiscal news are utilized, then one would expect to 
find a systematic relationship between the structural model forecast errors and the fiscal news 
variable.  The structural model exercise seems to suggest that either anticipated fiscal policy is 
not a visible component of household behavior, or the particular measures of fiscal news used 
here are not adequately capturing anticipation effects.   
 In the end, it is clear that more work must be done to understand the crucial question of 
how government spending affects the economy.  Possible extensions of this work are numerous. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the model presented in chapter three can be extended to include 
monetary policy and a variety of market imperfections.  The degree of monetary accommodation 
and the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy can influence fiscal multipliers, 
especially in the short run.   Priority should also be given to formally modeling anticipation 
effects in a structural setting.  Formal modeling may not only give insight into anticipation 
effects, but also help researchers develop and interpret reduced-form statistical models that are 





Model solution for the case of unrestricted labor supply 
 
1. Solving the household problem using dynamic programming 
After subbing equation (5) into (4), the Bellman equation takes the form:  
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Household first order conditions: 
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These equations, along with the fiscal policy rules (14) - (18) from the text, and the additional 
shock processes given by (1), (2), (6), and (10) from the text characterize the model’s 
equilibrium. When labor supply is restricted equations (3) and (15) are no longer needed, and the 
labor variables drop out of equation (13).  
 
3. Log-linearized system of equations 
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The five fiscal policy rules given in (13) – (17), definitions of aggregate tax revenues, and 
identities comprise the remaining eleven equations in a 33 equation system solved using the 






4. Finding the steady-state 
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Table 20. Ng and Komunjer (2011) parameter identification test,for the case where gamma is estimated. 
 
Original Model (gamma estimated):  A(33,33), B(33,9), C(9,33)
Found n_X = 14;  rank(CC)= 14;  rank(OO)=14
Transformed Model:  A(14,14);  B(14,9);  C(9,14)
n_theta = 35 n_x=14 n_eps=9
Order condition: n_theta=35    n_delta  297
Tolerance DL DT DU LT LU LTU Pass?
1.0E-02 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-03 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-04 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-05 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-06 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-07 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-08 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-09 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
1.0E-10 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
2.2E-12 35 196 81 231 116 312 Yes
Required: 35 196 81 231 116 312
 
Table 21. Ng and Komunjer (2011) parameter identification test, for the case where gamma is calibrated. 
 
Original Model (gamma calibrated):  A(33,33), B(33,9), C(9,33)
Found n_X = 14;  rank(CC)= 14;  rank(OO)=14
Transformed Model:  A(14,14);  B(14,9);  C(9,14)
n_theta = 34 n_ x= 14 n_ep s = 9
Order condition: n_theta=34  n_delta 297
Tolerance DL DT DU LT LU LTU Pass?
1.0E-02 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-03 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-04 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-05 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-06 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-07 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-08 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-09 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
1.0E-10 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes
2.2E-12 34 196 81 230 115 311 Yes


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3 Data 
 Fiscal variables are constructed following Leeper et al.  (2010) and Jones (2002).  The 
majority of the time series are from the Buereau of Economic Analysis’ NIPA, or NIPA data 
downloaded from the St. Louis Fed’s Fred database.  The few exceptions are noted below. Data 
were extracted in nominal terms and converted to real terms as described in the text.  
 
Consumption (C): defined as personal consumption expenditure on nondurable goods (NIPA 
Table 1.1.5 line 4) and on services (Table 1.1.5 line 5). 
Investment (I): defined as personal consumption expenditure on durable goods (Table 1.1.5 line 
3) and gross private domestic investment (Table 1.1.5 line 6). 
Consumption tax revenues (  ): defined as excise taxes and customs duties (lines 5 and 6 in 
NIPATable 3.2). 
Consumption tax rates: The average consumption tax rate is 
defined as 
   
  
       
  
 
where   
  is state and local sales taxes (Table 3.3 line 12). 
Capital and labor tax rates: Following Jones (2002), first the 
average personal income tax rate is computed: 
 
   
  
  
   




where IT is personal current tax revenues (Table 3.2 line 3), W is wage and salary accruals 
(Table 1.12 line 3), PRI is proprietors' income (Table 1.12 line 3), and CI is capital income. 
Capital income is defined as rental income (Table 1.12 line 12), corporate profits (Table 1.12 line 
13), interest income (Table 1.12 line 18), and PRI/2.  
The average labor income tax rate is computed as: 
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where CSI is contributions for government social insurance (Table 3.2 line 11) and EC is 
compensation of employees (Table 1.12 line 2).  The average capital income tax rate is 
calculated as: 
   
       
     
 
 
where CT is taxes on corporate income (Table 3.2 line 7) and PT is property taxes (Table 3.3 line 
8).  Capital and labor tax revenues. The capital and labor tax revenues are constructed by 
multiplying the average tax rate and tax base. 
Government expenditure (G): defined as government consumption expenditure (Table 3.2 line 
20), government gross investment (Table 3.2 line 41), and government net purchases of non-
produced assets (Table 3.2 line 43), minus government consumption of fixed capital (Table 3.2 




Transfers (TR): defined as net current transfers, net capital transfers, and subsidies (Table 3.2 
line 31), minus the tax residual. Net current transfers are defined as current transfer payments 
(Table 3.2 line 21) minus current transfer receipts (Table 3.2 line 15).  Net capital transfers are 
defined as capital transfer payments (Table 3.2 line 42) minus capital transfer receipts (Table 3.2 
line 38). The tax residual is defined as current tax receipts (Table 3.2 line 2), contributions for 
government social insurance (Table 3.2 line 11), income receipts on assets (Table 3.2 line 12), 
and the current surplus of government enterprises (Table 3.2 line 18), minus total tax revenue, T 
(consumption, labor, and capital tax revenues). 
Government debt (B): defined as                         
where Seigniorage is defined as       , M is the St. Louis Fed's adjusted monetary base, and 
NB is net borrowing. Net borrowing is computed using the NIPA deficits concept, specifically as 
G + INT + TR - T, where INT is interest payments (Table 3.2 line 28).
25
 
Hours worked: Hours worked is constructed from the following variables: 
H:  Nonfarm business, all persons, average weekly hours duration: index, 1992 D 100, 
seasonally adjusted. (From US Department of Labor, PRS85006023.) 
Emp:  Civilian employment: 16 years and over, measured in thousands, seasonally adjusted. 
(From US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CE16OV.) Turned into an index 
where 1992:3 = 100.  Hours worked are then defined as: 
 
  
     
   
 
 
                                                          
25 Following Leeper et al. (2010) I calculate the debt series starting from 1947, so that the starting value will not be 
too sensitive to the initial value.  To initialize the debt series, I use the 1947Q1 value of the Cox and Hirschhorn  
(1983) market value of debt. The Cox-Hirschhorn debt series is not used in general since the series is not consistent 
with NIPA's net borrowing definition. 
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Definition of observable variables 
An observable variable X is converted to log per-capita terms by transforming variable x in the 
following way: 
    (
 
        
)      
where Popindex in an index of Population, constructed so that 1992:3 = 1.  Pop is the civilian 
noninstitutional population, ages 16 years and over, seasonally adjusted, number in thousands 
(from US Bureau of La of Labor Statistics), LNS10000000. 
x = [consumption, investment, hours worked, government 
spending, labor tax revenues, capital tax revenues, consumption 





Chapter 4 data 
 The Federal Reserve forecasts are described in detail in chapter four.  All other data was 
graciously made available on Valerie Ramey’s website.  Below are the descriptions from Ramey 
(2011). 
 
1. Data for 1965–2005 
Data on nominal GDP, quantity indexes of GDP, and price deflators for GDP and its components 
were extracted from bea.gov on August 2009.  The combined category of real consumption of 
nondurables plus services was created using Wheelan’s (2000) method.  The nominal wage and 
price indices for business were extracted August 2009 from the bls.gov productivity program. 
The total hours data used in the baseline post-WWII regressions is from unpublished data from 
the BLS, kindly provided by Shawn Sprague. 
 
2. Hours: Historical series 1939–2008 
1939:1–1947:2: Ramey interpolates Kendrick’s (1961) annual civilian nonfarm, farm, and 
military hours series using monthly and quarter series published in various issues of the 
Statistical Abstract.  An advantage of Kendrick’s civilian series is that it includes hours worked 
by “emergency workers” as part of the WPA, etc. Various issues of the Statistical Abstract 
(available online through census.gov) report quarterly or monthly data on employed persons and 
average weekly hours of employed persons for farm and nonfarm civilians from1941:3 through 
1945. These are based on the household survey. In 1946, ranges of hours were reported, so that 
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Average weekly hours could be constructed.  Thus, total hours series for (nonemergency) farm 
and nonfarm civilians were constructed from these numbers from1941:3to 1946:4. The numbers 
of employed farm and nonfarm civilians from the household survey were reported from1940:2 
on, but average hours were not reported. For 1939:1 to1940:1, the only available series was the 
establishment based civilian nonfarm employment (available from bls.com). As there was no 
significant seasonality in the average weekly hours series for civilian nonfarm workers, Ramey 
used the employment series to extend the civilian nonfarm worker total hours back to 1939:1. 
There was, however, significant seasonality in the average weekly hours for farm workers.   
Ramey estimated seasonal hours factors for farm workers using data from1941:3–1947:3 and 
then applied those to the employment numbers to create total hours back to 1939:1. 
1947:3–2008:4: Because the earlier series were based on household data and because the match 
with Kendrick’s series was better, Ramey spliced the earlier data CPS household series 
from1947on. The seasonally unadjusted CPS monthly data were collected by Cociuba, Prescott, 
and Ueberfeldt (2009). Ramey then seasonally adjusted the entire series using the Census’ X12 
program, allowing for outliers due to roving Easters and Labor Days. However, because there 
was a noticeable permanent change in the seasonality of hours from1946 through1948, theX12 
program led to a few anomalous quarters, 1947:3, 1948:2, and1948:4. I smoothed these quarters 
by averaging with the surrounding quarters.  The military hours series was available quarterly 
from unpublished BLS data from 1948 on.   As noted above, the initial baseline regression uses 
the establishment-based hours series rather than the household series for comparability with the 





3. Tax Series 
Barro and Redlick (2010) provide an update for the Barro and Sahasakul (1983) average 
marginal tax rate series from 1912 through 2006.   Ramey had previously updated Alexander and 
Seater’s (2009) series through 2007 using their programs. The annual tax series are converted to 
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 Fiscal policy is investigated in two settings.  First, a fully identified neoclassical growth 
model with rich fiscal policy rules is augmented with non-Ricardian consumers and fit to post-
war U.S. data using Bayesian techniques.  Allowing transfer payments to directly affect the 
consumption choices of rule-of-thumb agents permits a new interpretation of time series 
evidence regarding which fiscal instruments have historically financed government debt.  The 
economic impact of fiscal adjustments is studied for two labor supply specifications.  The first 
specification restricts labor supply by equalizing hours worked across household types.  The 
second relaxes this assumption, allowing for intratemporal optimization by non-Ricardian 
households.  With respect to previous findings, capital and labor taxes are more important for 
debt stabilization while transfers play a smaller role.  Capital taxes and transfers play a larger 
role in output stabilization. 
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 Second, I explore the effects of anticipated policy changes.  If agents are rational, they 
will incorporate news about future spending changes before they are enacted.  I collected Federal 
Reserve forecasts for the period 1965 – 2005 from online archives of FOMC meetings.  I 
incorporate the forecasts as a measure of anticipated military spending to identify government 
spending shocks in a VAR.  When the raw forecasts are used I find that GDP, hours, wages, and 
consumption all rise following a shock to the news variable.  When I instead incorporate forecast 
errors in the VAR I find just the opposite: hours increase while wages and consumption fall after 
a government spending shock, as is typical with the narrative approach to identifying 
government spending shocks, pioneered Ramey and Shapiro (1997).  Thus, the way in which the 
forecast data is incorporated into the VAR becomes crucially important to the results.  
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